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DECODING JUDICIAL REASONING IN CHINA: A 
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
GUIDING CASES 
RUNHUA WANG* 
 
ABSTRACT  
The judicial system in China recently started using legal precedents—known as 
guiding cases—as a new legal source to eliminate adjudicative inconsistency. Guiding 
cases (“GCs”) present the current judicial reasoning to some extent and can be used to 
predict the future of judicial reasoning in China. What are GCs? What legal issues do 
GCs address? How do they address legal issues? How do GCs affect the legal system 
and adjudication in China? This Article answers these questions with empirical 
evidence and comparisons to judicial reasoning in the United States. It is the first 
empirical research providing a systematic review of all the GCs published by 
November 2019.  
GCs are de facto binding and treated as legal precedents by Chinese judges, even 
though the literature used to heavily debate whether they are “common-law 
precedents.” This Article’s research rejects the dichotomy between civil law and 
common law in the modern age. Instead, after reviewing the development and history 
of law in China, this Article argues that the Chinese legal system is in fact a dynamic 
mix between the civil and common law systems. The empirical design revisits 
American jurisprudential criteria to decode judicial reasoning in China. Even though 
these jurisprudential criteria are debatable by themselves, the hypotheses and the 
coding strategy rely on their overlaps and conflicts – a public or private interest-
concentrated perspective: How do Chinese courts treat the public and private interests 
under the various degrees of government intervention?  
The empirical analyses in this Article suggest that Chinese courts are on the path 
towards pragmatism and that there are common characteristics of the judicial 
reasoning in China shared by the U.S. Supreme Court. On the one hand, judges in 
China are state agents and follow state policies. They address social concerns and the 
public interest, which do not necessarily harm private interests or suggest conflicts 
with private interests. On the other hand, the Chinese courts are independent from 
administrative agencies, even though they defer to government interpretations of law 
to a greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Will there be a day when a robot can replace a judge? That day is near in Estonia, 
where an artificial intelligence (AI) judge will soon determine small claims cases.1 
Many universities, such as Stanford, Cambridge, and Peking, have developed AI 
programs to predict judicial outcomes—with up to 86.6% accuracy—and to promote 
settlements.2 For over a hundred years, since Holmes argued that the law could one 
day be predicted, people have been preparing for the day when AI becomes a broadly 
adopted tool to facilitate dispute resolutions.3 When law and legal systems develop 
and become increasingly dynamic,4 AI, which processes a significant amount of 
information on the law, can predict the law and judicial behaviors more accurately 
than people.5 However, AI has limited the ability to explain and judge the law and 
adjudication like judges and scholars.6 Conversely, the AI used in dispute resolutions 
 
1
 See Joe Pinkstone, AI-Powered Judge Created in Estonia Will Settle Small Court Claims of 
Up to £6,000 to Free Up Professionals to Work on Bigger and More Important Cases, DAILY 
MAIL (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-6851525/Estonia-
creating-AI-powered-JUDGE.html. 
2
 Tsinghua and College London also develop AI for judicial activities. See James South & 
Andy Rogers, What Might Artificial Intelligence Mean for Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 
KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Aug. 30, 2018), 
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/30/might-artificial-intelligence-mean-
alternative-dispute-resolution/; Could AI Replace Judges and Lawyers?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/technology-37749697/could-ai-replace-judges-and-
lawyers; Haoxi Zhong et al., Legal Judgment Prediction via Topological Learning, 
http://nlp.csai.tsinghua.edu.cn/~tcc/publications/emnlp2018_dag.pdf (last visited July 13, 
2019); Bingfeng Luo et al., Learning to Predict Charges for Criminal Cases with Legal Basis 
(July 28, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.09168.pdf. 
3
 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897). 
4
 Modern law, especially modern common law, is developing as dynamic with common-law 
and precedents and dynamic statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (“Statutes . . . should . . . be 
interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”); 
See infra Part I.  
5
 Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political 
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 
1150 (2004) (“The model predicted 75% of the Court’s affirm/reverse results correctly, while 
the experts collectively got 59.1% right.”). 
6
 Most prediction techniques in AI (e.g., neural network) are like a black box. Either 
classification trees or neural network focuses on the accuracy of its prediction, rather than the 
process of the prediction, which is also in a black box to be unexplainable. See id. at 1164, 1166 
n.48 (noting that most prediction approaches are a black-box besides the approach of 
classification trees, which is a transparent model); Zhong et al., supra note 2, at 3–4; Luo et al., 
supra note 2, at 4; Sharan Agrawal et al., Affirm or Reverse? Using Machine Learning to Help 
Judges Write Opinions 9 (June 29, 2017), 
https://users.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Affirm_or_Reverse.pdf. 
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demands the descriptive and prescriptive debates among judges and scholars to 
construct its development.7 
Compared to AI predictions, empirical studies in law can provide more descriptive 
and prescriptive information about the law for understanding the nature and 
development of law and judicial systems. As early as the 1940’s, C. Herman Pritchett 
empirically studied the votes and opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States (“SCOTUS”).8 Subsequent to Pritchett, despite an increasing number of 
thorough empirical studies about adjudication,9 scholars still expect more  empirical 
analyses about precedents in order to understand judicial reasoning in a systematic 
way.10 This Article employs an empirical method to systematically review all the 
binding legal precedents in China published by November 2019.11 It provides a broad 
understanding of the legal rationale in China by comparing the reasoning to that of 
U.S. lawyers and scholars.  
Recently, the judicial system in China started using a guiding case (“GC”) system 
of legal precedents to improve adjudicative consistency.12 To date, the Supreme 
People’s Court (“SPC”) has selected, compiled, and published 112 de facto binding 
 
7
 All the literature of legal prediction in supra note 2 includes a section discussing the 
characteristics of judicial behaviors or case law before constructing the prediction models. See, 
e.g., Masha Medvedeva et al., Judicial Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Looking into the Crystal Ball, http://martijnwieling.nl/files/Medvedeva-submitted.pdf (last 
visited July 13, 2019) (designing a network based on various citations to predict judicial 
behaviors before conducting another prediction by neural networks). 
8
 See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
POLITICS AND VALUES (1948), cited in Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial 
Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2017, 2019–21 (2016) (discussing the contribution of 
Pritchett as a political scientist in judicial science). 
9
 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court's First Era: 
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (2010); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
(2013). 
10
 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (providing a template of systematic 
analyses of precedents for empirical scholars and listing several controversial or unknown 
questions to be answered in the future); Rogers M. Smith, The “New Institutionalism,” and the 
Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POLITICAL SCI. J. 89, 102–04 (1988) (calling for more quantitative 
and qualitative research about adjudication). Empirical evidence for precedents and judicial 
behaviors is not consistent as the law, and judicial system are dynamic and developing. 
11
 Legal precedents in this Article refer to precedents that are binding. See Mo Zhang, Pushing 
the Envelope: Application of Guiding Cases in Chinese Courts and Development of Case Law 
in China, 26 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 269, 269 (2017) (“China is known as a civil law country 
where the judges do not have law-making power and the courts generally do not follow 
precedent.”). 
12
 See Kang Weimin Jr., Self-Perfection of the Judiciary with Socialism in Chinese 
Characteristics, 8 LAW APPLICATION 2 (2011) (introducing that the intent to establish the 
guiding case system is to eliminate adjudicative inconsistency).  
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GCs to guide inferior courts.13 Does the establishment of the GC system mean that 
China—traditionally believed as a civil law country—now has common-law 
precedents? Asking a question like this is a common mistake. First, China cannot be 
simply labeled as a civil law country.14 Second, it is not essential to debate on the 
dichotomy between common law and civil law in front of many modern legal systems 
in the world.15 By contrast, the establishment of the GC system means that the Chinese 
judicial system is increasingly mixed and dynamic because it relies on both legislative 
statutes and judicial law as legal sources.16 Unveiling the GCs is more important to 
understand the legal system in China, compared to merely reviewing the statutes.  
Based on the rejection of the dichotomy between civil law and common law, this 
Article adopts the controversial jurisprudential theories—legal formalism, legal 
realism, and legal pragmatism for analyzing common-law precedents—to explain the 
judicial reasoning in the GCs.17 Western jurists, especially Americans, are familiar 
with these theories but do not know much about judicial reasoning in China. For 
example, judicial independence in China is a controversial issue to most western 
scholars, because the governance philosophy in China is distinguished from many 
western countries.18 Those jurisprudential theories contribute to explore some 
concerns for judicial independence by asking how much courts contemplate the public 
interest and private interests.19 This measurable question and those jurisprudential 
theories help explain the judicial reasoning in China to American lawyers and 
scholars. Therefore, this Article’s empirical research is designed using a spectrum, 
which assembles the arguments among those jurisprudential theories from the 
dimensions of public and private interests. Then, this research fits the GC system to 
this spectrum.  
 
13
 See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo De Guiding (最高人民法
院关于案例指导工作的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work 
on Case Guidance] (promulgated by Adjudication Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 15, 2010, 
effective Nov. 26, 2010) June 12, 2015, art. 4 (China); THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.court.gov.cn/shenpan-gengduo-77.html (last visited 
January 21, 2020).  
14
 See infra Part I.C.2. But see Zhang, supra note 11, at 269. 
15
 See infra Part I. 
16
 See infra Part I.A, I.D.  
17
 This research adopts these three concepts of philosophy in legal analyses and the debates 
by legal scholars, so they refer to legal formalism, legal realism, and legal pragmatism, rather 
than philosophical formalism, realism, and pragmatism. See POSNER, infra note 19, at 105–26. 
18
 See, e.g., RENE DAVID & JOHN BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 518–33 (1968) (concerning the 
governance of the communist party and its inheritance of socialism from Marxism and the 
U.S.S.R.).  
19
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 105–26 (2013) (defending 
pragmatism from formalism and realism argues that judges do not make law but only apply 
law); Smith, supra note 10, at 100 (arguing that creativity of judges are shown in their legal 
reasoning under Public Law theories). 
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Four hypotheses are developed based on this spectrum.20 First, common-law rules 
and formalism are more likely to lead courts to concern private interests and ignore 
the public interest in their adjudication. Second, realism drives courts to be concerned 
about the public interest more than private interests in judicial reasoning. Third, 
pragmatism accepts both realistic and formalistic concerns, and courts try their best to 
interpret the law practically. Fourth, public interests and private interests are 
associated, but the direction of the association depends on the facts and the law. 
In order to test these four hypotheses, this research codes (1) the characteristics of 
the legal issues, statutes, and judicial interpretations addressed in the GCs; (2) the 
characteristics of their text, structure, and logic of judicial reasoning; (3) how the GC 
ruling courts treated the public and private interests in adjudication; (4) the categories 
of the policies and social concerns behind the GCs and; (5) how these GCs involve 
government interpretations of laws and government decisions. The research then 
applies descriptive statistics to analyze the coded information and employ logistic 
regressions to explore the association between the characteristics of the GCs. The 
empirical results are arguably consistent with the hypotheses and can be explained by 
the jurisprudential theories from the perspectives of the public and private interests.  
Comparing GCs with SCOTUS decisions suggests that the two judicial systems 
share mutual characteristics. First, GCs, as a source of authority for statutory 
interpretation, have a policy function to strengthen law enforcement. Second, Chinese 
courts are encouraged to be pragmatic, which is also a trend shown in the U.S. 
Moreover, the systematic analyses suggest that the SPC has a policy concern to 
instruct inferior courts to fill the gaps of statutory law with concerns about the public 
interest and state policies.  
Part I reviews the taxonomy of civil and common law and introduces the GC 
system. Part II introduces the empirical study design. This Part first discusses the 
hypotheses for the empirical analyses and the jurisprudential theories behind the 
hypotheses. Then, it presents the coding strategy and discusses the limitations of the 
methodology. Part III describes the characteristics of the GCs by descriptive statistics 
and tests the hypotheses by logistic regressions. Based on the descriptive statistics and 
the logistic regression results, this Part compares the GCs with SCOTUS decisions. 
Part IV makes implications and discusses the potential future of the judicial system in 
China under the influence of the GC system.  
I. CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 
In the literature discussing GCs, scholars, especially Chinese scholars, heavily 
debate the question of whether the GCs are legal precedents or common-law 
precedents.21 Civil law and common law are two distinct legal traditions.22 They are 
 
20
 See infra Part II.A.  
21
 See Mark Jia, Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2213, 2231–34 (2016); Deng Jinting, The Guiding Case System in Mainland China, 10 
FRONTIERS OF L. IN CHINA 1, 2 (2015) (arguing that China has common law in reality); Yang Li, 
Practice and Theory of the Guiding Case System in China, 46 HONG KONG L. J. 307, 333 (2016) 
(arguing that China will look for a balance between common law and civil law for the 
emergence of the GCs). 
22
 Russell A. Miller, Germany’s German Constitution, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 95, 101 (2017). 
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utterly disparate in sources of law, jurisprudence, legislation, adjudication, and legal 
education.23 Civil law systems originated from Roman Law.24 They further evolved 
from the formal written law to systematic codifications and compilations.25 By 
contrast, common law was not gained from Roman Law.26 Rather, common law, 
known as judge-made law,27 was mainly developed from England and other English-
related countries.28 Traditional common law is a bundle of rules,29 adopting legal 
precedents, rather than codifications.30 Nowadays, however, scholars have noticed 
that the boundary between the civil law and the common law is increasingly obscured. 
Modern common law systems moved first and inevitably started adopting legislative 
statutes and “unprecedented” law in the 19th century.31 Modern civil law systems also 
developed to be dynamic and embraced legal precedents in their sources of law.32 
Moreover, there are mixed jurisdictions, such as China, which inherit or consult both 
legal traditions.33 Because of the development of modern legal systems and the 
appearance of mixed jurisdictions, this Part discusses why the dichotomy of civil law 
and common law is outdated. Therefore, the arguments about this dichotomy are not 
necessary to be addressed in understanding GCs.  
  
 
23
 John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S.C. L. 
REV. 1865, 1865 (1988) (listing the differences of the two legal traditions, including “[t]he 
peculiar national histories and traditions, the specific structures and processes of legal 
education, legal scholarship, law-making, executive,” administrative action, “prevailing 
paradigms of the legal process,” legal sources, methods of finding and applying the law, and 
what judges are and what they do in the legal systems of the two legal traditions.). 
24
 Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 419, 420 (1966–1967). 
25
 Id.; see also William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 680 (2000). 
26
 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 1–3 (1973) (recognizing 
some effects of Roman Law on some common law notions and procedures). 
27
 Id. at 12. 
28
 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 309. 
29
 See generally Id.  
30
 CAENEGEM, supra note 26, at 12. 
31
 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 330–31 (introducing the modern reforms of the 
common law in the 19th century to face unprecedented development of legislation). 
32
 See Miller, supra note 22, at 101. 
33
 Tetley, supra note 25, at 684 (“A mixed legal system is one in which the law in force is 
derived from more than one legal tradition or legal family.”). 
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A. Modern Civil Law Systems 
In modern practice, civil law systems are increasingly using previous judicial 
decisions as legal sources, even though these decisions, in general, are not binding.34 
Only some particular previous legal cases are binding as common-law precedents in 
some civil law countries.35 For example, the opinions from the German Federal 
Constitutional Court are binding upon all German courts.36 In order to improve 
adjudicative consistency, a preliminary ruling by the Joint Panel of the Supreme 
Courts of the Federation will be provided for the five German Federal Supreme Courts 
before the Courts make any deviant decisions.37 Moreover, civil law practitioners 
(e.g., in Germany) treat consistent case decisions as an independent legal source.38 
These practitioners increasingly cite previous judicial decisions in front of judges.39 
Civil law courts also unavoidably apply legal precedents in particular cases due to the 
vagueness of the codes (e.g., France).40 
Besides the endogenous needs of improving adjudicative consistency, wars, 
colonial power, and other international relationships exogenously impact the 
development of civil law systems. For example, the civil law system in Japan adopted 
judicial decisions as a legitimate source of law under the influence of the U.S., a 
common law country, after the Second World War.41 The Supreme Court of Japan 
summarizes cases in volumes of Catalog Records and its inferior courts, in general, 
shall comply with the decisions of the Superior Court in addition to the statutory 
laws.42 
 
34
 Dainow, supra note 24, at 426. 
35
 See Huang Yaying, Preliminary Review of the Problems of Constructing the Case Guidance 
System in China, 1 COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 2 (2012); see generally CAENEGEM, supra 
note 26; Goto Takehide, The Effects of Precedents on Japanese Law in the Modern History, 1 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 75 (1997); Ninon Colneric, Guiding by Cases in a Legal System 
Without Binding Precedent: The German Example, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL CHINA GUIDING 
CASES PROJECT (June 19, 2013), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/7-judge-colneric/. 
36
 See generally Colneric, supra note 35. 
37
 Id. 
38
 See generally, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (1987); see also John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1997). 
39
 Dainow, supra note 24, at 427. 
40
 See, e.g., id. 
41
 See generally Kenzo Takayanagi, Contact of the Common Law with the Civil Law in Japan, 
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 60, 60–69; Yaying, supra note 35; CAENEGEM, supra note 26. 
42
 See generally Takayanagi, supra note 41; Yaying, supra note 35; CAENEGEM, supra note 
26; Takehide, supra note 35. 
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Modern civil law systems are dynamic with the involvement of common-law 
precedents.43 Statutory law is the core of the civil law tradition,44 even though 
codifications that the civil law systems rely on are not entirely identical to statutory 
law.45 Statutes could be reformed based on the development of common-law 
precedents. Common-law precedents may also triumph over civil law codes, which 
frame the statutory law and function as a base law when courts apply the statutes.46 
Therefore, comparative law scholars, David and Brierley, criticize the label of civil 
law based on the use of codes.47 Other scholars also criticize this label from a 
constitutional law perspective. Miller and Murphy have discussed the rise of 
constitutional law, which increasingly appreciates private rights in the civil law 
countries and suggests an invasion of common law.48 This invasion happens because 
the democracy embedded in constitutional interpretation is derived from common 
law.49  
B. Common Law and Statutes 
Common law systems have modern movements to include legislation and statutes 
in legal sources.50 The old-fashioned common law in the 19th century was 
“individualistic,” meaning that the law was to adjust private interests, but not public 
interests or obligations.51 This individualistic concept does not prevail anymore in the 
 
43
 See generally Miller, supra note 22. 
44
 Id. at 109 (“The civil law tradition emphasizes statutory law.”). 
45
 Id. at 118–20 (explaining that codifications are the basic law and the courts apply statutes 
according to the codifications). 
46
 Id. at 114–18 (arguing that German Constitutional Law that includes binding precedents 
has possibilities to triumph over “civilian formalism and positivism” that are the tradition that 
the German Civil Code). 
47
 See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 22–24 (using Romano-Germanic family to 
describe conventional civil law systems because the civil law system is a narrow definition 
compared to Romano-Germanic family). 
48
 See Miller, supra note 22, at 109–12 (introducing the conflicts between the common law 
character of constitutional law and the civil law); Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, 
and Constitutional Democracy, 52 LA. L. REV. 91, 94, 104–13 (1991) (criticizing the lack of 
democracy in civil law and discussing the contribution of constitutionalism on democracy). 
49
 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996) (arguing that a nexus exists between U.S. Constitutional law and the common 
law). 
50
 See, e.g., DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 330 (introducing that legislation is a source 
of English law, and U.S. law includes more written statutes than English law). 
51
 Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law-A Scot’s View, 63 HARV. L. REV. 
468, 474 (1950); Duncan Kennedy, Form Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976). 
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modern common law systems, where individualism is broadly rejected.52 Public 
welfare is addressed by legislators in statutes and by judges in common-law rules.53 
In statutory interpretation, modern judges do not create law, but only apply the law to 
the facts.54 
Common-law judges used to follow legal formalism or realism to analyze only 
case law and other common law doctrines.55 Traditionally, formalistic judges apply 
the canons and common-law principles deduced from the precedents,56 which 
resemble the syllogism for interpreting civil law statutes.57 With the rise of legislation 
and statutes, formalism and realism inevitably become strategies of legal reasoning 
for statutory interpretation.58 The traditional formalism approach of statutory 
interpretation was criticized by realists, such as Holmes and Posner, who argued that 
the canons and principles lack deductive reasoning, making them contradictory and 
unclear.59 Realists consider a combination of authorities, including statutes, common-
law rules, and public policies, and use practical tools in legal reasoning.60 Even though 
modern formalism, like realism, applies public policies, economic theories, and other 
social norms in legal analyses,61 modern judges have become more supportive of 
 
52
 Kennedy, supra note 51, at 1731–37. 
53
 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) 
(arguing that U.S. judges are not legislators but can be considered as rule makers and rule 
appliers). 
54
 POSNER, supra note 19, at 106; see also Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 
CAL. L. REV. 465, 502–03 (1988) (arguing that realist judges seem to make law in the process 
of “weighing [which means counting, observing, finding]” law). 
55
 Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 180 (1986). 
56
 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation: In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 807 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 411 n.21 (1989). 
57
 See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL 
THEORY 111, 111 (2010). 
58
 See generally Singer, supra note 54 (explaining how formalism and realism are applied in 
legal reasoning).  
59
 See generally Holmes, Jr., supra note 3; Posner, supra note 55, at 196; Posner, supra note 
56, at 808; William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). 
60
 See Jay M. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
724, 725 (1988). Therefore, it is difficult to clearly distinguish legal realism and legal 
pragmatism in some circumstances.  
61
 See Posner, supra note 55, at 185. See also Singer, supra note 54, at 522 (arguing law and 
economics is “very much an exercise in formalism” because its efficiency theory strictly 
instructs to maximize utility). 
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realism than formalism because of the limitations of statutes and formalism in 
statutory interpretation.62  
The text of a statute is ambiguous, vague, and frequently changed for policy 
purposes.63 Inconsistency and gaps exist between statutes,64 notwithstanding that 
statutory laws fill the gaps in common law precedents.65 Even though common law 
statutes provide detailed definitions, applications, or exceptions and are clearer and 
more specific compared to the concise civil law statutes,66 merely relying on the 
statutory language may fail to construe the legislative intent.67  
Legal realism has pros and cons in statutory interpretation when fixing the 
problems of statutes. On one hand, the statutes can further be reformed and clarified 
under the influence of realistic statutory interpretation.68 This is also the reason why 
common law systems are considered as dynamic and efficient.69 On the other hand, 
the inefficiency of common law remains in the legal system and may not be fixed by 
statutes.70 Some statutes are simply transformed from common-law rules (e.g., 
Sherman Act).71 These statutes can only function as ornamentation in realistic 
adjudication and could be read against the precedential background by courts.72 
  
 
62
 See Singer, supra note 54, at 467 (“To some extent, we are all realists now.”).  
63
 See Leiter, supra note 57, at 119–20. 
64
 Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1551. 
65
 Sunstein, supra note 56, at 417; Tetley, supra note 25, at 684. 
66
 Tetley, supra note 25, at 703. 
67
 James MacCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, 2 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 7, 25–26 
(1965). 
68
 William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1042 (1989).  
69
 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) (arguing common 
law is efficient).  
70
 See generally Wes Parsons, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE. L.J. 862 (1983). 
71
 A statutory law like the Sherman Act only has the structure of statutes and is a combination 
of common law doctrines in substance. Posner, supra note 56, at 808. Cf. Posner, supra note 
55, at 197 (explaining that the Sherman Act directs courts to create common law); Archibald 
Cox, Book Review: A Common Law for the Age of Statutes by Guido Calabresi, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1463, 1472 (1982); Tetley, supra note 25, at 705. The U.S. has the Uniform Law 
Commission to develop efficient uniform law materially based on common law rules, which 
can be adopted by states. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, OVERVIEW, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview. 
72
 Posner, supra note 55, at 197; Posner, supra note 56, at 808; Cox, supra note 71, at 1472; 
Tetley, supra note 25, at 705. 
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C. Other Legal Systems 
Common law and civil law systems are modernizing by integrating the 
characteristics of each legal tradition. Comparatively, there are mixed, more liberal 
jurisdictions that derive elements from the two legal traditions.73 Moreover, the world 
was also construed by other legal traditions, such as Muslim law, Hindu law, and 
ancient Chinese law.74 These long-established legal traditions have modern faces, 
involving features of common law and civil law.75 Overall, mixed jurisdictions are the 
prevailing trend in many countries.76 
1. Mixed Jurisdictions 
The main difference between a civil law system and a common law system is not 
the form of their legal sources (i.e., statutory law or case law), but rather their legal 
reasoning.77 A legal system with codifications and statutory laws may not be 
recognized as a civil law system, which could be a modern common law system, such 
as the U.S.78 A legal system without codifications could be viewed as a civil law 
system, such as Scotland, which is a mixed jurisdiction and codifies civil law rules in 
a systematic manner.79 Civil law systems apply legal principles to reason instances.80 
The process of the application follows syllogisms, which means that civil law judges 
first identify the functions of the general legal principles and then determine the 
domain of the application of the principles in distinct cases.81 Common-law judges 
also adopt legal principles.82 Unlike civil law systems, these judges apply precedents 
to reason legal principles and legal rules.83  
 
73
 FREDERICK P. WALTON, THE SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER 
CANADA 1 (1907). 
74
 Islamic law is a religious law, which does not necessarily equate to the present laws of 
Muslim countries. Even though Hindu Law and ancient Chinese law have been disintegrated, 
their influence on society remains. See generally DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18. 
75
 See generally id. 
76
 Tetley, supra note 25, at 679. 
77
 See Cooper, supra note 51, at 470–71. 
78
 Id. at 472; Tetley, supra note 25, at 679. 
79
 Dainow, supra note 24, at 424; Tetley, supra note 25, at 683. 
80
 Cooper, supra note 51, at 471. 
81
 Id.; Dainow, supra note 24, at 431; Tetley, supra note 25, at 702. 
82
 Cox, supra note 71, at 1467. 
83
 Cooper, supra note 51, at 471; Dainow, supra note 24, at 425; Harlan F. Stone, The Common 
Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1936). 
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The logic to apply precedents by common-law judges, nevertheless, follows the 
syllogistic structure as civil law systems.84 Gradually, the accumulated principles and 
rules evolve and dynamically affect the judicial reasoning by common-law judges.85 
Meanwhile, even though the philosophy of civil law principles originated from Roman 
law, the principles developed by borrowing some legal thoughts from judicial 
decisions and common law.86 Gradually, a civil law system, such as Scotland, evolves 
into a mixed jurisdiction.87  
2. Chinese Legal System — Foundation of the Guiding Case System 
The modern Chinese law shows a framework akin to the German legal system.88 
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese legal system is trending toward embracing case law. The 
GC system is the remarkable terminus a quo of this trend. This institutional innovation 
of the GC system is, in part, inherited from Chinese history and, in part, transplanted 
from other legal systems. Generally, Chinese law develops by oscillating between 
morality and realism. 
a. Historical Perspective 
Chinese law is distinguished from the civil law derived directly from Roman Law 
but has developed by itself as an independent legal tradition. Before the Spring and 
Autumn period (771 to 476 BC), the Chinese legal system mainly adopted unwritten 
customary laws,89 rather than customs in writing, which were the sources of civil 
law.90 It was similar to the stage when local English customs were applied as a legal 
source before precedents were compiled and adopted in the English legal system.91 
 
84
 Realism believes that legal reasoning is deductive logic. Posner, supra note 55, at 181, 184–
85. The logic to apply major premises and minor premises for the decision of cases follows the 
syllogistic structure. 
85
 Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1487; Stone, supra note 83, at 7. 
86
 Cooper, supra note 51, at 470. 
87
 Id. at 468. 
88
 See generally Edward J. Epstein, Tortious Liability for Defective Products in the People's 
Republic of China, 2 J. CHINESE L. 285 (1988). 
89
 “Yu Xing” adopted by Xia Dynasty (about 1900-1600 BC), was the earliest written law in 
China and merely used to administrate slaves. While there was written law before Spring and 
Autumn period, the content of the written law was limited and in secret. Jiang Guohua & Zhao 
Xinlei, Matching the Case System with Chinese Characteristics and Chinese Legal Culture, 3 
JIANGHAN ACADEMIC 78, 78–79 (2018). 
90
 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICAN 24 (3d ed. 2007).  
91
 See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 30 (3d ed. 2005). 
English law has a long history between the late-13th century to the mid-19th century to establish 
a system of compiling precedents, which is a further improvement of its legal system from 
customary laws to common laws. See generally Julius Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom 
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Gradually, written statutes were used and further developed to “lü,” referring to 
criminal law, and “ling,” referring to administrative regulations, called “ge” and 
“shi.”92 These various types of written statutes supplemented or complemented one 
another.93  
When statutes were broadly applied, “li,” which referred to cases or precedents,94 
in principle functioned as supplements to statutes until the Ming dynasty (1368-
1644).95 In the Ming and Qing dynasties (1644-1912), statutory laws compiled both 
codes and some “lis” that were acknowledged by the central government.96 During 
the period after the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) was established in 1949, and 
before the establishment of the GC system in 2010, the SPC compiled volumes of case 
reports, gradually extending from merely criminal cases to all types of cases.97 These 
compiled cases were published internally or externally to help train judges and 
evaluate adjudicative inconsistency.98  
In the process of this institutional development, morality—a type of social 
welfare—was significantly planted in the ancient Chinese law and influences the 
context and the enforcement of the current law.99 In the early stage, when written 
statutes were adopted, Xun Kuang first suggested a combination of morality and 
penalties in the design of the legal system.100 His jurist students, Li Si and Han Fei, 
did not agree with his philosophy of morality when they were designing the Qin 
rules.101 However, their legal theory to strengthen the despotic power of the empire 
 
in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931); CAENEGEM, supra note 
26; Zhou Dao-Luan, Establishing the Case Guidance System Suiting China’s Own National 
Conditions, 4 J. OF XIANGTAN U. PHIL. & SOC. SCI. 28 (2013); Yaying, supra note 35. 
92
 Guohua & Xinlei, supra note 89, at 79. 
93
 Ni Zhengmao, Exploring Comparative Law, 2 COMPARATIVE STUD. ON INSTITUTIONAL 
LEGAL CULTURE 217, 217 (2006). 
94
 “Case” means “precedent” in the Chinese language. 
95
 Guohua & Xinlei, supra note 89, at 79. 
96
 Id. See also Cheng Hao, The History of Chinese Precedent Laws, 3 J. TAIYUAN NORMAL U., 
SOC. SCI. 63 (2018). 
97
 These cases are not binding, and an overall system for both these cases and GCs is 
recognized as the case guidance system. Linfeng Wang, The Necessity and Function of China’s 
GCs System, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL: CHINA GUIDING CASE PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2013), 
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/9-professor-wang. 
98
 Second Five-Year Reform for the People’s Court (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 
26, 2005) (China), translated in Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/second-five-year-reform-program-for-the-
peoples-courts-2004-2008-cecc#body-chinese) (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
99
 Xu Xiangming, About the Path of Rule of Law in China, SOUHU (Oct. 2, 2018), 
http://www.sohu.com/a/257455246_467293. 
100
 Id. 
101
 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 446. 
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through stringent penalties was considered as the key reason why the Qin dynasty 
(221-207 BC) ended so quickly.102 Later, Xun Kuang’s philosophy was adopted by 
Dong Zhongshu, who further theorized that morality was the mainstream of law and 
penalties were supplemental to morality.103 Dong’s philosophy was inherited in the 
legislation in the dynasties of Han, Jin, Sui, and Tang (202 BC-907).104 In those times, 
a world without a theory of positivism and a Hart-Fuller debate,105 the legislation and 
the enforcement of the written statutes in China were guided by principles of morality, 
which stabilized the governance of the early Chinese empires and lasted many 
thousands of years to the present day.106 
b. Transplant Perspective 
The civil law of China originally evolved from Japan, rather than Germany.107 In 
the late 19th century, as the result of a series of wars, the Qing government allowed 
Japan, Britain, and several other countries to have consular courts and extraterritorial 
rights to exclusively rule their citizens and the business transactions within the 
particular International Settlements in China.108 The application of these various legal 
systems inside China was a shock to the enforcement of the Qing Code.109  
Later, Britain and other countries proposed to withdraw their extraterritorial rights 
with a condition of amending the Qing Code.110 These proposals encouraged the Qing 
 
102
 Id. at 443; see JIANG ZHENGCHENG, CHU’S TALENT IN QIN – LI SI (2014); Feng Youlan, The 
Core of the Thinking of Legalist Were Not Law, But the Methods of Empire, IFENG.COM (Jan. 
17, 2011), 
http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguogudaishi/special/shangyang/detail_2011_01/17/43039
41_0.shtml. 
103
 Xiangming, supra note 99. 
104
 Id. 
105
 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - a Reply to Professor Hart, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957). 
106
 Xi Jinping, Persisting in Combining Rule by Law and Rule by Morality in Governing the 
Country, XINHUANET (Dec. 10, 2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-
12/10/c_1120093133.htm. 
107
 Deng Feng, The Law and Economics of the Reform at the End of Qing Explains Why China 
Learned Civil Law, 2 PEKING U. L.J. 165, 165 (2009). 
108
 In the Amendment of Treaty of Nanking signed after the First Opium War (enacted in 
1843), Britain acquired consular jurisdiction. In Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty 
(signed Sep. 13, 1871), Japan and China gave consular jurisdiction to each other. Fengxue Rong, 
The Truth of Concessions, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE, 
http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=4060 (last visited Dec. 7, 2019). 
109
 Chen Yaping, Renewed Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Britain and China 
and Legal Reform in the late Qing, 1 STUDIES IN QING HISTORY 58, 62 (2004). 
110
 Feng, supra note 107, at 166; SU LI & HE WEIFANG, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY OF CHINA: 
ACADEMIA AND SOCIETY - LAW 103, 192, 330 & 392 (2001). 
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government to reform the Qing Code with legal transplants from Japan.111 The 
Japanese system digested the institutional design and judicial intelligence from many 
western countries.112 Its law enforcement was combined with morality, which shared 
the mainstream philosophy in China and distinguished it from the “violent” German 
legal system.113  
As time went on, the civil-law theories and the codification skills from the German 
Civil Code (“BGB”), and the compilations of Switzerland, Brazil, Italian, etc., were 
further studied by the Chinese and adopted into Chinese codes, especially under the 
influence of the wars in the early 20th century.114 In the early stage when the P.R.C. 
was established, David and Brierley criticized that the adoption of “Romano-
Germanic codes” was only a piece of equipment for the governance of the Communist 
Party, and that western legal thinking was never embraced in its path of socialism.115 
However, this is not true anymore as the governance is stable.  
“[L]aw is not an end, but a means to an end – the adequate control and protection 
of those interests, social and economic. . . .”116 Justice Stone’s realistic rationale117 
was true for Qing legislators when they reformed the law for sovereignty and social 
stability, even though they finally did not walk on a path of common law. It is also 
true for many civil law systems in legal transplants or self-development, including 
today’s China. As their societies and economies have developed, many European 
countries do not persist with their civil law pedigrees and, instead, progress towards 
mixed legal jurisdictions with dynamic legal thinking.118 This movement can also be 
seen in the future of the legal system of China.  
  
 
111
 See XU ZHUOYUN, TEN-THOUSAND YEARS HISTORY (2017); Yaping, supra note 109, at 60. 
Qing officials inspected both the common law and civil law systems in Britain, the U.S., 
Germany, France, Japan, and some other countries and appreciated the legal education and the 
jurisprudence in Japan. See Feng, supra note 107, at 169–72; Yaping, supra note 109, at 64. 
112
 Feng, supra note 107, at 171. 
113
 Id. at 169, 171; Yaping, supra note 109, at 64. 
114
 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 446. 
115
 Id. at 231 (arguing that the Communist Party was opposed to Romano-Germanic Codes in 
earlier years because it was close to Marxism). 
116
 Stone, supra note 83, at 20. 
117
 See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 228–29 
(1972). 
118
 Cooper, supra note 51, at 470; WALTON, supra note 73, at 1 (“A mixed legal system is 
commonly defined as a system in which the Romano-Germanic tradition has become suffused 
to some degree by Anglo-American law.”). 
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D. The Guiding Case System 
In China, the main legal source is statutory law. Besides statutes and regulations, 
the SPC also provides judicial interpretations, which are binding.119 In 2010, to 
improve adjudicative consistency, the SPC established the GC system, in which the 
SPC establishes a Case Guidance Office to select, compile, and publish GCs.120 The 
GCs are court decisions made by the SPC or the inferior courts.121 The SPC selects 
GCs by referral under the standard that the cases should suggest significant social 
concerns or deal with typical, representative, or difficult legal issues.122  
The first set of GCs was published in 2011,123 and the GC system is increasingly 
emerging. Even though some scholars argue that the GCs should not be considered as 
 
119
 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Rénmín Fǎyuàn Zǔzhī Fǎ, (中华人民共和国人民法院组
织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 2007) 2006 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. art 33 (China). See Chenguang Wang, Law-
Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a Country of Rapid Social 
Changes, 4 FRONT. L. CHINA 524, 535 (2006) (arguing that judicial interpretations are binding). 
120
 Zuìgāo Rénmín Fǎyuàn Guānyú Ànlì Zhǐdǎo Gōngzuò De Guiding, (最高人民法院关于
案例指导工作的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case 
Guidance] (promulgated by Adjudication Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 15, 2010, effective 
Nov. 26, 2010) June 12, 2015, art. 4 (China). 
121
 There is much literature in English introducing how the GCs are selected and how they 
function. See Fengping Gao, China’s Guiding Cases System as the Instrument to Improve 
China's Case Guidance System, which Includes Both Guiding Cases and Typical Cases, 45 
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 230, 233 (2017); Jia, supra note 21, at 2213; Jiang Xiaoyi & Shao Ling, 
The Guiding Case System in China, 1 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 106, 117 (2013). 
122
According to the 2010 Guiding Case Provisions, to qualify as a guiding case two 
requirements must be met: (1) [T]he judgment of the case has taken into effect, and (2) the 
case shall have one of the following values: (a) [I]t is of great social concern; (b) [I]t 
involves the issue for which the legal provision is relatively general; (c) [I]t is typical; (d) 
it is difficult, complicated or of new type; or (e) [I]t contains other quality of guidance. 
Zhang, supra note 11, at 285–88 (listing the detailed requirements for the selection of GCs 
and the factors that have been considered by the SPC before the establishment of the GCs but 
may affect the selection).  
123
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Fabu Diyipi Zhidaoxing Anli De Tongzhi, (最高人民法
院关于发布第一批指导性案例的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the 
First Set of Guiding Cases] 2011 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 354, (Sup. People’s Ct. 2011) (China). 
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“common-law precedents,”124 these cases are “de facto binding.”125 Judges at any 
level are trained to learn the GCs.126 Some GCs have been cited as legal sources by 
the inferior courts.127 Therefore, some other scholars suggest that China cannot be 
simply defined as a civil law system and the GCs are a crucial tool for lawyers and 
scholars to understand law and law enforcement in China.128 The bottom line of these 
various arguments among scholars is that GCs are a judicial source of law. They can 
be applied as judicial interpretations by courts129 and can influence legislation in the 
future.130  
 
124
 See Jia, supra note 21, at 2231–34 (concluding that the GCs are more civil than common 
and rejecting that the GCs are “common law” precedents). But see, Jinting, supra note 21, at 2 
(arguing that China has common law in reality); SU & HE, supra note 110, at 333 (indicating 
that China is looking for a balance between common law and civil law by using both the 
statutory law and GCs). 
125
 Guo Feng Jr., The Compilation and Application of China’s Guiding Cases, STAN. L. 
SCHOOL CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT 3 (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/18-guo-feng/ (“[GCs] are of authoritative, 
normative, exemplary, and uniformly applicable nature. They are de facto binding.”). 
126
 See Gao, supra note 122, at 235 (introducing how GCs are instructive in the mandatory 
training process). 
127
 See, e.g., Chengdushi Shichang Jiandu Guanliju, Chengdu Shucuifang Shipin Youxian 
Gongsi Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zaishen Xingzheng Panjue Shu (成都市市场监督管理
局、成都蜀粹坊食品有限公司工商行政管理再审行政判决书) [Chengdu Shu Cuifang Food 
Co. v. Chengdu Admin. for Indus. & Commerce], (Sichuan Chengdu Intermediate People’s Ct. 
Nov. 15, 2017) (China) (citing N.47 Guiding Case); Yidali Feililuo Gongsi Su Tesha 
(zhangjiagang) Shipin Youxian Gongsi Buzhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (意大利费列罗公
司诉蒙特莎（张家港）食品有限公司不正当竞争纠纷案) [Ferrero Int’l S.A. v. Montresor 
Food Co.], 2015 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 47 (Tianjin High People’s Ct. 2005) (China). 
128
 See Jocelyn E. H. Limmer, China’s New Common Law: Using China’s Guiding Cases to 
Understand How to Do Business in the People’s Republic of China, 21 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. 
& DIS. RES. 96, 133 (2013) (emphasizing the importance of the GCs to the contract law and 
business plans in China); Zhiyu Li, Innovation Through Interpretation: How Judges Make 
Policy in China, 26 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 327, 371, 378 (2018) (showing that most judges 
in China follow the GCs and check other cases and arguing that GCs are policies made by the 
SPC). 
129
 See Chenguang Wang, Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in 
a Country of Rapid Social Changes, 4 FRONT. L. CHINA 524, 537–44 (2006). 
130
 E.g., The trademark law was amended as consistent as a guiding case after the guiding case 
was published for five years. Wang Suiyong Su Shenzhen Gelisi Fushi Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 
Hangzhou Yintai Shiji Baihuo Youxian Gongsi Qinhai Shangbiaoquan Jiufen An (王碎永诉深
圳歌力思服饰股份有限公司、杭州银泰世纪百货有限公司侵害商标权纠纷案) [Wang v. 
Ellassay Fashion Co.], 2017 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 82 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2014) 
(China) [hereinafter N.82 Guiding Case]; Shangbiao Fa (商标法) [Trademark Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 
1983) 2019, art. 4.1, 68.4 (China). 
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II. EMPIRICAL STUDY DESIGN 
In contrast to the literature about GCs which is primarily doctrinal,131 this Article 
conducts an empirical study to systematically review the GCs. After addressing 
whether GCs are common-law precedents in Part I, this Part employs the 
jurisprudential criteria for analyzing common-law cases, legal realism, formalism, and 
pragmatism, to design the empirical study of GCs.132 This Part first establishes a 
spectrum, which links the public and private interests under the jurisprudential 
theories. Based on the spectrum, it sets up the hypotheses for this empirical research 
and explains why the spectrum borrows the tool of law and economics to categorize 
utility. Then this Part does not only apply the spectrum to code the GC system under 
various jurisprudential theories, but also discusses the limitations of the data and the 
coding strategies.  
A. Hypotheses: From Public Interests to Private Interests 
The logic of observing judicial reasoning from a perspective of public and private 
interests is drawn in the spectrum in Figure 1. The top of the spectrum refers to the 
theories behind the development of the U.S. common law and statutory interpretation. 
The bottom of the spectrum refers to the inclusive law and economic theories. These 
theories function as tools to measure various types of utility addressed in judicial 
reasoning and explain the association between public and private interests behind 
judicial reasoning.  
To explore how the courts adjudicating the GCs addressed public and private 
interests in judicial reasoning, and how the SPC instructs inferior courts to address 
public and private interests, this research mainly proposes four hypotheses. First, if a 
court is formalistic, mechanically applying the statutes that benefit interest groups, 
and rules in a conventional common-law style (i.e., individualism), its opinion 
concentrates on the rights and liabilities of the private parties and the transactions 
 
131
 Peking University runs a database of law and legal documents, pkulaw.cn. It provides 
annual statistical reports about how GCs are applied by the courts in China.  
132
 See Posner, supra note 55, at 197 (arguing that realism and formalism are used to interpret 
common-law cases). 
Private InterestsPublic Interests
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Figure 1. Public/Private Interests-Concentrated Judicial Reasoning
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between them.133 Second, if a court is realistic to apply the same law and statutes that 
benefit the public interest, the court opinion tips more to the public interest and may 
even impair the interests of the disputed private parties to some extent. Third, the 
opinions of pragmatic courts vary between public and private interests depending on 
the facts and the law.134 Fourth, the public interest and private interests are associated, 
but the association could be either positive or negative depending on the facts and the 
law. 
1. Legal Formalism and Private Law 
The first hypothesis is based on the dichotomy between public and private law, 
and how the U.S. common law system was developed from private law. Public law 
respects public welfare, and private law respects personal interests.135 In other words, 
public law directly maximizes public welfare by maximizing individual utility.136 
Private law maximizes individual utility, but it recognizes that personal interests are 
not “subordinated” to the public welfare.137 
The foundation of U.S. law is private law, the nature of which is the conventional 
common law plus the notion of common law formalists to apply the conventional 
common law.138 The reason is that the conventional common law was built around 
individualism:139 “I am entitled to enjoy the benefits of my efforts without an 
obligation to share or sacrifice them to the interests of others.”140 The main body of 
private law, which includes property, tort, and contract law, also benefits from a 
 
133
 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 241, 265 (1986) (arguing that 
legislative statutes do not always benefit the public interest and common-law canons may 
aggravate how the statutes benefit particular private groups in practice). 
134
 See Posner, supra note 53, at 7–8 (distinguishing pragmatists from positivists because 
pragmatists weight more facts than authority compared to positivists). 
135
 See THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1, 1 §2 (Alan Watson ed., 1998), quoted note 1 in Alain 
Supiot, The Public-Private Relation in the Context of Today’s Refeudalization, 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 129, 129 (2013). 
136
 See Supiot, supra note 135, at 131 (using the Soviet Union and Marxism as examples to 
interpret an extreme case of public law). 
137
 See id. (introducing that private law cuts the nexus between private utility and the general 
good). 
138
 William N. Eskridge & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a 
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 711 (1991) (introducing the history of law 
in 1890s when the mainstream ideology accepted by “elite legal society” was formalism). 
139
 See Cooper, supra note 51, at 474; Kennedy, supra note 51, at 1685. 
140
 Kennedy borrows the concept of “self-reliance” to explain individualism. In order to come 
out this explanation for individualism, Kennedy reviews the literature in history, philosophy, 
and politics by that time, which is included in note 74 in his paper. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 
1713. 
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theoretical foundation of individualism.141 Formalists practicing in the U.S. determine 
the common law by looking to the canons, rules, and doctrines established by courts 
in the various states.142  
Legal formalism evolves and adjusts to modern common law143 – emphasizing the 
importance of the logic of analyzing common-law rules and doctrines but banishes 
policies and principles.144 Even though it gradually embraces principles, legal 
formalism still refers to a rigid logical deduction in legal analysis.145 During its 
evolution, legal formalism has been widely recognized as the foundation for doctrinal 
analysis of law, especially common-law cases.146 Due to formalism, the law is 
distinguished from morality and argued as science.147 On the one hand, the separation 
 
141
 See id. at 1715 (“Individualism provides a justification for the fundamental legal 
institutions of criminal law, property, tort, and contract.”). 
142
 The canons, rules, and doctrines were established for eliminating judicial inconsistency, 
which is a natural result of the “splintering” of English common law applied by the multiple 
states in America. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 20 
(1960), quoted in Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes, Langdell and Formalism, 15 RATIO JURIS 26, 26 
(2002) (introducing the contribution of Llewellyn in legal theories and formalism and reviewing 
the history of common law and formalism in the 18th century and early 19th century); JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 874 (2009) (introducing that English common 
law is the origin of the U.S. common law). 
143
 But see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The 
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 888 (1991) (arguing 
that formalism is diminished when the legislation triumphs over common-law cases). I do not 
distinguish the concepts between common law formalism, Langdell formalism, and modern 
legal formalism here. One reason is that Posner, who raises modern legal formalism argues, that 
legal formalism is a tool for analyzing common law cases and doctrines, rather than interpreting 
statutes. The other reason is that despite the fact that modern legal formalism is not parallel to 
common law formalism and Langdell formalism, Posner agrees that they are related. See Posner, 
supra note 55, at 180–81. 
144
 Kelley, supra note 142, at 29–32 (anatomize the Langdell formalism by reviewing his 
books, lectures, and teaching philosophy in Harvard). Both of the concepts (i.e., common law 
formalism and conventional common law) was predominant only before the 20th century. 
Common law formalism was refined by Langdell. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 1725–31 
(introducing private law theory based on individualism was predominant between 1800s-1940s 
and outdated after the 1900s); Eskridge & Peller, supra note 139, at 711–12 (arguing that 
common law formalism was predominant in 1890s and outdated after the 1920s). 
145
 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 459 (2000) 
(criticizing that the formalism is not practical because of its bigotry with the concepts and 
principles embedded in the law). 
146
 Holmes and Posner agree that legal formalism is the foundation for doctrinal analysis of 
common law cases, while they and other realists still criticize it. See Holmes, Jr., supra note 3, 
at 991–92; Kelley, supra note 142, at 30; Posner, supra note 55, at 180–81 (“Formalist can 
mean . . . rigorous, modest, reasoned, faithful, self-denying, restrained.”). 
147
 Kelley argues that Langdell inherits John Austin and sets a rigid distinction between law 
and morality. See Kelley, supra note 142, at 35–40 (organizing the works and lectures done by 
Christopher C. Langdell, who uses the concept of formalism and first argues that law is science, 
between 1870 and 1887). 
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is opposed by normative theorists who believe that common-law judges rely on 
morality in adjudication.148 On the other hand, it is useful to instruct the courts to 
apply common-law rules and doctrines149 and interpret statutes.150  
Formalistic legal reasoning contributes to how the law develops to benefit public 
and private interests beyond the dichotomy between public and private law. Realists, 
who oppose legal formalism, apply formalistic logic to argue the efficiency of 
common law and how common law and statutes maximize public and private 
interests.151 On the one hand, formalistic logical deduction in syllogism helps realists 
reveal that common-law rules and legislation may merely benefit particular interest 
groups but fail to benefit the public welfare.152 On the other hand, the root of 
formalism that is common law formalism is defective by common law formalism 
itself: Private law does not mean not to protect public interests or necessarily conflicts 
with public interests. The common-law rules consistent with individualism and 
 
148
 Positivism, emphasized by Hart in the middle 20th century and followed by other realists, 
agrees with formalism on setting a clear boundary between law and morality. See generally H. 
L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594–95 
(1957) (originally raising positivism to separate law and morals). See Richard A. Posner, A 
Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 775, 776 (1981) (responding to normative scholars’ concerns about morality in 
adjudication). But see generally Fuller, supra note 105; Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, 
Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1150–53 (1999) (arguing that formalism does not connect 
with positivism). 
149
 Doctrinal analysis is a critical and lasting methodology for legal studies. See Posner, supra 
note 55, at 190 (agreeing that the application of common law cases is conceptual deductive, 
even though common law cases are linear). 
150
 Even though Posner argues that formalism and realism are only used to analyze common 
law cases, but he recognizes the connection between common law doctrines and statutes. In 
statutory law, formalism is easily understood as textualism. See id. at 197 (explaining that there 
are two categories of statutes, clear and specific or expected to be interpreted by the courts by 
using or developing common law doctrines); James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources 
of Law, 2 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 7, 16 (1965) (arguing that common law is a product or consequence 
of legislation); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 442 (using “formalism” and “textualism” parallelly). 
151
 See generally POSNER, supra note 69, at 67; Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law 
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Posner, supra note 148, at 781–83; Nuno Garoupa & 
Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 307, 317 (2012); Singer, supra note 54, at 522 (“Law and economics is very much an 
exercise in formalism.”). But see Parsons, supra note 70 (applying economic theories to argue 
reckless and non-reckless common-law doctrines are economically inefficient in adjudication). 
152
 See Posner, supra note 55, at 193–94 (arguing the impossibility that legislative’s purpose 
of social optimum can be achieved through benefiting particular groups’ interests and increasing 
competition). This failure can also be explained under the public choice theory: Judges and 
legislators, who make collective decisions, are impossible to flatly address the public welfare 
but redistribute the public interests to particular interest groups. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways 
of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 823–31 (1982) (explaining how the public 
choice theory based on Arrow’s Theorem suggests the failure of formalistic courts’ 
interpretation of legislation and application of precedents/common-law rules); Farber & 
Frickey, supra note 143, at 879 (introducing that both positivism and public choice theory agree 
on the inconsistency of the public welfare and the accumulated groups’ interests). 
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utilitarianism remain in the law but are argued as departing from private law because 
individualism is not the core of the modern common law.153 For instance, people 
believe that contracts respect “free will,” unlike state regulations, which govern 
transactions by employing restrictions.154 In other words, people are the masters of 
their contractual terms, without government intervention.155 This formalistic vision is 
impractical, and contract law is not pure private law because of the defective premises 
of contract law in formalism. Freedom of contract does not consider (1) the situations 
of “fraud, duress, or incapacity”156 that are addressed by so-called morality, market 
efficiency, or public utility; (2) the enforcement of contract through public power;157 
and (3) the liberties tolerated by the government.158 Moreover, the legislative 
obligations, function of deterrence (e.g., punitive damages), and other social norm 
concerns in tort law haul it from pure private law.159 Property law also involves 
public-law features when the U.S. Constitution, a public law, secures private property 
rights from government intervention and protects public interests.160  
  
 
153
 See Posner, supra note 148, at 776 (“Wealth maximization is closely related to 
utilitarianism, and the formative period of the common law as we know it today, roughly 1800-
1950, was a period when utilitarianism was the dominant political ideology in England and 
America.”). 
154
 The idea is originally raised by Henry Maine. See HENRY SUMMER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: 
ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 
304–05 (1961) (arguing the movements of society from status to contract); Singer, supra note 
54, at 479–80 (discussing Maine’s theory of free will in contracts against regulations). 
155
 See Singer, supra note 54, at 479–80. 
156
 Id. 
157
 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with 
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 
570 (1982) (“Freedom of contract is freedom of the parties from the state as well as freedom 
from imposition by one another.”). 
158
 See Singer, supra note 54, at 479 (“The state refuses to regulate the substantive terms of 
private relations.”). 
159
 See id. at 480 (arguing that tort law was not treated as private law in 1859 due to the “state-
imposed obligations”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1771 (2012) (arguing that tort law shows public law characters by 
conducting guiding rules and the concerns about social norm and providing examples of 
punitive damages). 
160
 See Macey, supra note 133, at 240 (explaining why Constitution Law protects public 
interests); Chaim Saiman, Public Law, Private Law, and Legal Science, in WORKING PAPER 
SERIES N. 56 691, 692–93 (2008) (explaining that the Constitution protects economic freedom, 
which is the public welfare). 
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2. Legal Realism, Statutes, and Public Interests 
Realists develop modern common law further by standing on the shoulders of 
formalism and legislation.161 Realists and formalists agree on the importance of legal 
doctrines, principles, and precedents,162 however, realists believe that law is not 
neutral, but policy-driven.163 The premise relied upon by normative jurists164 that 
judges are legislators is not precise in a modern common-law system. Under legal 
realism, modern U.S. judges are not legislators and do not make law, but only interpret 
the law by following the legislature (i.e., Congress), statutes, or common-law 
precedents.165 The distinction between realists and normative jurists does not mean 
that realists are cruel to deny morality, but legal realism treats morality as a policy 
question or a legislative question. Morality, as a concern about public welfare, can be 
addressed by legislators or the government.  
Realists may intend to improve public welfare and may prefer government 
intervention and other types of public power over free markets.166 The first reason is 
that realists pursue the economic efficiency of society and market transactions,167 
which is also the purpose of most statutes.168 The accumulation of the maximized 
utility of private parties in a free market does not necessarily result in a maximized 
 
161
 See Saiman, supra note 161, at 694 (discussing the transition from private law/common 
law to public law modes of legal reasoning under realism in 20th century in the U.S.); Eskridge 
& Frickey, supra note 59, at 345 (arguing that positive way to interpret statutes forms dynamic 
legal systems). 
162
 Holmes is always considered as the founder of realism and positivism. While he heavily 
criticized Langdell, he was not in complete antithesis to Langdell, and they agreed on the 
importance of legal doctrines, principles, and precedents to justice and adjudication. See 
generally Holmes, Jr., supra note 3, at 991; see also Kelley, supra note 142, at 30, 48–50 
(discussing the common characters shared by Holmes and Langdell in jurisprudence).  
163
 See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 138, at 712–13 (introducing that realists in 1920s –1930s 
argued that law is not neutral but policy-driven). 
164
 Fuller is a representative normative scholar, against to positivism. See Fuller, supra note 
105, at 631 (“A rule of law is … the command of a sovereign, a rule laid down by a judge.”). 
165
 Jurists in recent years roughly agree that the U.S. Congress is the legislator. Judges are not 
legislators. They do not make law, but only interpret the law or apply the rules. See POSNER, 
supra note 19; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536–37 
(1983); Stone, supra note 83, at 14; Posner, supra note 53, at 8. 
166
 See Singer, supra note 54, at 482 (defining that realism counters self-regulating market 
systems but supports state involvement or state control). Singer argues that what is more 
important than the distinction between a free market and a regulatory market is who is the group 
protected in the market because a free market and a regulatory market can never be completely 
segregated. Therefore, the courts protect a free market may take market orders into 
consideration. 
167
 Id. at 483. 
168
 Parsons, supra note 70, at 885–87 (arguing that statutes and codification are more 
economically efficient than common law).  
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utility of the society but may harm the society’s utility. For example, the problem of 
the tragedy of the commons occurs in an over-privatized system.169 Freedom in 
commons does not bring wealth to everybody but increases transaction costs and 
results in inefficiency.170 Therefore, the law made by legislators or enforced by courts 
should allocate private property rights efficiently.171  
The second reason is that constitutions, which are the foundation of law, are public 
law. The U.S. Constitution draws the boundary between individual freedoms and 
government power.172 This does not mean that the legal issues that cannot be solved 
by common-law rules or doctrines must be constitutional questions. Instead, courts 
should address existing public policies or the public interest when deciding such legal 
issues. Private-law doctrines do not consider social and political issues much, so they 
are constrained on many legal questions raised based on those issues.173 For instance, 
the private parties who have difficulties filing family and privacy suits under the tort 
law or family law can sue for copyright infringement in the U.S., named as potential 
economic loss.174 Here, copyright protection constitutes a particular policy concern 
about promoting invention and creation.  
The third reason is that private rights can only be enforced through public power. 
A free market is self-constrained for lack of enforcement power.175 Government 
intervention in contracts is inevitable regardless of how the contracts are endowed 
with free will. Therefore, realists support the proposition that government can directly 
intervene in private relationships or restrict people’s freedom for protecting the public 
interest or indirectly intervene the market through its involvement in a private 
 
169
 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); Michael 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Market, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
170
 See id. 
171
 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (proposing institutional control over the commons to allocate 
sources efficiently). 
172
 Saiman, supra note 160, at 702. 
173
 See generally id. at 696–703 (arguing that private law doctrines have restrictions on dealing 
with many questions, especially the questions having social and political considerations). 
174
 Gilden initially explores this phenomenon and encourages the courts to clear the rules. 
Even though courts do not clear rules in copyright law to deal with such situations and announce 
that copyright law only compensates economic losses but solve such issues under copyright law 
in practice. See Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1022 
(2019). 
175
 See, e.g., Eskridge & Peller, supra note 138, at 714 (discussing that strict trespass must be 
enforced through judicial powers). But see generally Steven B. Burbank et al., Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013). Private enforcement exists and can be 
efficient in various circumstances depending on how the law is designed and the social costs of 
the law. 
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controller in the market, such as a monopoly party.176 Overall, the second 
hypothesis—in brief, realistic courts are likely to address the public interest in their 
opinions—is deduced from these three reasons.  
A strong connection between legislation and legal realism draws criticism.177 
Statutes do not always benefit the public interest.178 First, many people disagree on 
the premise that legislation stands on the public interest.179 When statutes benefit 
particular interest groups, Posner argues that the social optimum cannot be achieved 
through free competition between the advantaged interest groups.180 Second, even 
though the statutes have a purpose of benefiting the public interest, they cannot avoid 
the problem of public choice: The statutes can be used to benefit particular 
individuals.181 This problem has been observed as “rent-seeking.”182 It is impractical 
that common-law courts can always follow policies to benefit the public interest and 
cure the problem of public choice in legislation, primarily when the statutes do not 
target on the public welfare.183 Third, the limitations on textualism may lead to 
statutory interpretations benefiting private parties.184 These above criticisms show 
that legal realism cannot draw a clear boundary between law and politics.185  
  
 
176
 See generally Singer, supra note 54 (explaining the two measures of government 
intervention).  
177
 Positivism and realism rely on authority. See Posner, supra note 53, at 6–8 (distinguishing 
positivists and pragmatists by arguing that the former group relies much on authority and the 
latter group relies much on facts). 
178
 See Macey, supra note 133, at 232–33 (introducing three categories of statutes, benefiting 
the public welfare, namely benefiting the public welfare but benefiting interest groups in 
substance, and benefiting interest groups); Posner, supra note 55, at 194–95 (arguing that 
legislature should benefit the public welfare but does not benefit in practice).  
179
 Macey, supra note 133, at 240, et seq. 
180
 See Posner, supra note 55, at 193. 
181
 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 143, at 880 (discussing the problem of public law due to 
public choice under formalism); see generally Easterbrook, supra note 166. 
182
 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 143, at 879–80. (arguing that using formalism, 
“contemporary republicanism,” can observe rent-seeking phenomena). 
183
 See id. at 889–905 (agreeing that legislatures have stronger feelings on public values than 
common-law courts, even though common law principle may adopt public interests). 
184
 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 340–44 (arguing that current values addressed 
in statutes can be changed or influenced by the standing of the interpreter for the limitations of 
linguistics). 
185
 See Saiman, supra note 160, at 697–98 (arguing that legal science is the separation of law 
from politics). 
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3. Legal Pragmatism and Government Intervention 
Government intervention becomes ubiquitous in law,186 but it may not benefit the 
public interest as a collective action.187 Pragmatists believe in the separation of law 
and politics.188 They can tolerate the effects of different forms of law on public and 
private interests, which is also the third hypothesis for the empirical study.189  
Pragmatism is a philosophical concept accepted by Germany and many other 
countries.190 Before Posner distinguished legal pragmatism from philosophical 
pragmatism, many U.S. jurists used the term “pragmatic” to describe realism.191 
However, legal pragmatism and legal realism differ. On the one hand, legal 
pragmatism is in harmony with legal formalism by following formalism’s logical 
deduction to conclude in legal analysis.192 Pragmatists also embrace normative 
considerations to some extent, addressing fairness, equality, and other moral 
concerns.193 On the other hand, while realists and pragmatists both weigh political 
 
186
 Realists believe that state and policies intervene in all kinds of private transactions. See 
Singer, supra note 54, at 495 (“The market allocates and distributes power and wealth, and its 
mechanisms and institutional structures are created and enforced by law.”); Eskridge & Peller, 
supra note 138, at 767, et seq. (explaining that new public law rejects the distinction between 
private law and public law because public policies intervene in contract, torts, and property). 
187
 See supra Part II.A.3.  
188
 See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1447, 1457 (1990); see also Eskridge & Peller, supra note 138, at 769 (“The legal process 
thinkers of the 1950s articulated the distinction between law and politics through the mediation 
of substantive pluralism on the one hand, and procedural determinacy, itself heavily dependent 
on the objectivity of representation, on the other.”). 
189
 Pragmatists take legal process into account in their considerations.  
190
 See Posner, supra note 53, at 18.  
191
 See id. at 3–8 (introducing the concept of legal pragmatism and distinguishing it from 
positivism); Singer, supra note 54, at 500 (arguing that realism is roughly same as pragmatism 
in terms of deducing rules of abstraction). 
192
 See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 138, at 769 (“Law was both the qualitative principles of 
common law formalism and the quantitative policies of regulatory science. Some realms were 
best left to expert resolution, others to reasoned elaboration – the pragmatic weaving together 
of principles and policies that defined the special judicial competence – and still others to 
resolution by the open-ended discretion of democratic choice.”); Leiter, supra note 148, at 
1155–58 (distinguishing legal process from positivism because legal process embraces morality 
for practical reasons, which is consistent with positivism). 
193
 See Fish, supra note 188, at 1457 (arguing that pragmatism’s nature is political but named 
with apolitical terms, such as “fairness, equality, [and] what justice requires); Leiter, supra note 
148, at 1157 (arguing that the legal process theory of adjudication makes morality legitimate). 
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authority194 and facts in legal analysis, realists weigh authority more than facts, and 
pragmatists weigh facts more than authorities.195  
Pragmatists are not opposed to common-law rules and the neutrality of due 
process, but they are consistent with realists on believing that these legal concepts are 
big and empty.196 Pragmatists inherit from realists a consideration of “actual facts, 
exact discourse, actual experience, [and] a rational scientific account.”197 In other 
words, pragmatists are practical and concerned about all external factors and 
uncertainties.198 Pragmatic judges are prudent, securing the consistency of law in the 
past and future, rather than merely enforcing statutes and other law from the authority 
as realists, or more precisely, positivists.199 Posner suggests that all U.S. courts and 
judges should be pragmatic,200 which makes the U.S. judicial system predominant 
over other legal systems in the world.201  
4. Public/Private Interests in the Premises of Law and Economics 
It is not surprising that courts may start from maximizing private interests in 
adjudication but end with a rule concerning the interests of third parties or other public 
good.202 It is because public and private interests are neither opposed to each other 
 
194
 Fish, supra note 188, at 1452 (“In this [practical reasoning] vision authority itself is 
rhetoricized and politicized.”). 
195
 This argument is truer for positivists than realists, but I do not distinguish realism and 
positivism at this point and agree with Leiter on that “legal realists are tacit legal positivists.” 
See Posner, supra note 53, at 6–8 (comparing between positivists and pragmatists); Leiter, supra 
note 148, at 1153–55. But see Eskridge & Peller, supra note 138, at 764–65 (arguing that realism 
and positivism share many common characters but are not perfectly parallel). 
196
 See STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING 210 
(1994) (“[T]he basic realist gesture . . . dismiss[es] the myth of objectivity as it is embodied in 
high sounding but empty legal concepts (the rule of law, the neutrality of due process) and then 
replace it with the myth of the ‘actual facts’ or ‘exact discourse’ or ‘actual experience’ or a 
‘rational scientific account,’ . . . .”); Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be 
Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. (2003) (“[P]ragmatism is not 
empty and devoid of substance.”). 
197
 See Fish, supra note 188, at 1459 (introducing these realists’ characters that pragmatists 
do not reject). 
198
 Id. at 1457.  
199
 See Posner, supra note 53, at 4 (arguing that pragmatic judges secure the consistency of 
law and consider the law in the future). 
200
 Id. at 18. 
201
 Id. at 19 (arguing the U.S. judicial system is better than English, Australian, and Dutch 
judicial systems because U.S. judges are both rule makers and rule appliers and the latter judges 
are more rule appliers and less pragmatic).  
202
 See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 159, at 1771 (arguing that tort law has a function of guiding 
social behaviors and articulates social norms); Singer, supra note 54, at 482–85 (arguing that 
U.S. courts show public law characteristics when they fill the gaps in contract terms). 
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nor linearly associated, which is the fourth hypothesis for this empirical study. Law 
and economics can be a tool to explain their associations. The public interest is the 
foundation of private interests, which is also the reason why the premises of 
conventional, behavioral, expressive, and normative law and economics share 
common and conflicted parts in terms of public and private interests.  
The premise of conventional law and economics (“CLE”) is that people are rational 
and self-interested, attempting to maximize their expected utility measured by wealth 
or money.203 Behavioral law and economists (“BLEs”) criticize this premise and 
argue that people sometimes are irrational and have biases.204 It is impractical to 
assume that private parties always sue to pursue maximizing their monetary utility.205 
Expressive law and economists (“ELEs”) rephrase some systematic biases recognized 
by BLEs as plural utility that people value. The importance of morality and fairness 
within the scope of the public good, emphasized by normative scholars, has been 
systematically explored by psychologists206 and can be considered as plural utility 
argued by ELEs. Overall, BLEs attack the rational choice theory (i.e., CLE),207 ELEs 
propose that people have plural utility,208 and normative scholars stick with 
morality.209  
The above arguments suggest that public and private interests may conflict in the 
short term or a single context. These conflicts are visual and intuitive to be discussed 
by legal scholars as gaps in or inconsistencies of the law.210 Legislators and pragmatic 
judges also concern these conflicts as policy issues to promote legal certainties and 
fill the gaps in the law.211 Therefore, people in law can tolerate these conflicts from a 
macro perspective to observe how public and private interests are addressed in judicial 
reasoning.  
 
203
 Even though Korobkin and Ulen categorize rational choice theory from “thin” to “thick,” 
these three characters are the more with the “thick” theory to describe conventional law and 
economics. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–
66 (2000) (using a spectrum from “thin” to “thick” to introduce the rational choice theory). 
204
 See id. at 1083–1102 (discussing the defects of the rational choice theory due to various 
biases); see generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2016). 
205
 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 203, at 1075–1143. 
206
 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).  
207
 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 203, at 1060–66 (criticizing the limitations of 
conventional law and economics for its defective assumptions based on rational choice theory).  
208
 See Dan M. Kahan, The Economics – Conventional, Behavioral, and Political – of 
Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence, in FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 1616 (2010). 
209
 See Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics, 
18 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 259 (2004). 
210
 See Fish, supra note 188, at 1452–55 (arguing that political concerns and social concerns 
are datable and have conflicts). 
211
 See id. at 1455 (explaining that judges should focuses on personal values when social 
values have conflicts from Posner’s perspective). 
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B. Coding Strategy 
This research codes both the substance of the GCs and the format of their text. 
With respect to the substance of the GCs, it codes (1) the parties in the disputes; (2) 
the private and public interests addressed in the disputes; (3) how the ruling courts 
dealt with these interests; (4) the legal sources applied by the ruling courts; and (5) the 
logic of the legal reasoning. This Section mainly introduces the coding strategy for the 
substance of the GCs.  
This research adopts two main measures to capture private interests. The first 
measure is based on the visible outcomes of the GCs, whether both the plaintiff and 
the defendant were better off, or at least one party was “abnormally” harmed and could 
not be fully compensated by the court. In a criminal case, if the defendant was 
punished, but received a light sentence for voluntarily entering a guilty plea, both 
parties, the state and the defendant, were better off. Based on Pareto Optimum and 
Utilitarianism,212 this measure is coded as a categorical variable (“0” no parties are 
harmed, “1” both private parties are better off, “2” at least one party is harmed). The 
second measure is related to the first measure, which is whether the court showed a 
concern to maximize the interest of the parties in its judicial reasoning. This measure 
is captured by a binary variable (“0” No, “1” Yes). The relativeness of the two 
measures is whether the ruling court expected the visible outcome of the adjudication.  
This research mainly adopts three measures to capture the public interest as binary 
variables (“0” No, “1” Yes). The first measure is whether there was a social concern 
addressed by the ruling court. A court may have concerned the influences of the case 
on the society, such as the power of the judiciary, the authority of law, the litigating 
parties’ activities, the legal issue addressed in the lawsuit, and the court opinion for 
such a legal issue.213 The court may have also concerned state policy issues, such as 
state governance,214 social stability,215 social conflicts under state governance, moral 
social norms, education issues, market orders,216 people’s standard of living, and the 
 
212
 Utilitarianism is considered as Pareto improvement, using the outside sources to reallocate 
the inside sources and maximize the wealth of the insiders. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical 
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
487, 488 (1980) (“Pareto superiority is the principle that one allocation of resources is superior 
to another if at least one person is better off under the first allocation than under the second and 
no one is worse off.”). 
213
 See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 159, at 1771 (arguing that social norms and the social effects 
of law are public features). 
214
 State governance is one of the judicial values or the values of law. See Scott M. Sullivan, 
Judicial Deference and Democratic Values, 53 TULSA L. REV. 363, at 364 (2017); Posner, supra 
note 55, at 199–200. 
215
 See Fish, supra note 188, at 1456 (discussing the value of law on stability, which is also 
an institutional norm). 
216
 See Singer, supra note 54, at 482–84 (arguing that encouraging market transactions is a 
public concern and refers to social policies); see, e.g., Saiman, supra note 160, at 692–93 
(arguing constitutional law is public law for protecting economic freedom). 
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interest of the public, people, and consumers.217 Normative jurists, representing 
conventional common-law judges, believe that law has a consequence on society, and 
law and judges should be responsible for considering morality.218 Moral concerns are 
also addressed in the history of Chinese law.219  
The second measure is whether a third party’s interest was protected by the court 
regardless if a real third party was involved in the lawsuit. This measure is selected 
for following Zipursky’s discussion about whether tort law addresses a third party’s 
interest.220 Protecting a third party’s interest is against the traditional private-law 
perspective that concentrates on the interest of the private parties in front of a court.221 
It also reflects that courts may concern the public welfare when they apply common-
law rules or statutes in adjudication.222  
The third measure is related to the efficiency concern: Did the ruling court consider 
maximizing the public welfare? The accumulation of the maximized utility of the 
private parties could result in a maximized public welfare, or the court preferred the 
public welfare to the private parties’ interests. Whether the public welfare can be 
maximized is an empirical question to be explored in the future and out of the control 
of the ruling court and the SPC when the ruling court decided the case and the SPC 
compiled the case.223  
In order to measure the techniques of judicial reasoning, this research uses binary 
variables to measure formalistic legal reasoning. Precisely, did the court follow 
syllogism to apply statutes, civil-law principles, common-law rules, and judicial 
interpretations?224 The techniques of judicial reasoning are useful for interpreting 
 
217
 See Jia, supra note 21, at 2213–14 (arguing that GCs reflects the judiciary that is not 
independent and under the political control of the Communist Party); see generally Jerome Alan 
Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and “Judicial Independence”: 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 967 (1969) (criticizing the exclusion of judicial independence in the legal regime of China 
in fifty years ago); DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 446–47, 449 (arguing that the law and 
the judicial system were independent in form but were the tool of state governance in substance). 
218
 The common ground of legal science shared by Langdell and Holmes, which is non-
normative, makes Langdell sometimes be criticized as realism or positivism. See Thomas C. 
Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 39 (1983) (introducing that most common 
law judges did not agree on the non-normative part of Langdell formalism, which is the 
separation between morality and law, when they decided cases); Farber & Frickey, supra note 
143, at 882 (explaining that normative theorists believe that law influences consequences, so 
law should be moral and take morality into account). 
219
 See supra Part I.C.2.  
220
 See generally Zipursky, supra note 145; Zipursky, supra note 159. 
221
 Zipursky, supra note 159, at 1769–70; Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 
1928). 
222
 See Zipursky, supra note 159, at 1780–81. 
223
 See Leiter, supra note 148, at 1149 (arguing that realists use social science to solve 
problems). 
224
 See Posner, supra note 55, at 182 (distinguishing formalism from realism because 
formalists focus on the process and the logic of rule deduction). 
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precedents and statutes, and understanding the legislative intent, the legislative 
purpose, and the text of the law.225 Therefore, formalism could be a useful tool to 
track the trend of how a court addresses public and private interests by applying 
common-law rules and private law. Common-law rules and private law, developed 
around private interests in history, do not necessarily result in only benefiting private 
interests.226 Contract law, property law, and tort law have doctrines about public 
interests.227 
If the ruling court applied statutes and civil-law principles, the research captures 
whether there was a specific statute dealing with the legal issue and whether the civil-
law principle was expressed in statutes or judicial interpretations. If the ruling court 
explained a legal concept, the research measures whether the statutory language 
addresses this concept. Without citing any statutes, the court may have creatively 
interpreted the concept by common-law rules, semantic interpretations, deference to 
the government, or judicial interpretations published by the SPC or the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”).228  
Realistic and pragmatic reasoning cannot be directly observed. Instead, they can 
be indirectly observed by how the court treated policies, government intervention, the 
market, and various types of public interests, addressed in the measures of public and 
private interests and formalism. In modern common-law reasoning, which is a process 
of logical deduction from premises to conclusion, legal realism focuses on the choice 
of the premises, distinguished from legal formalism, which focuses on the process of 
the deduction.229 For instance, the premise of wealth maximization in CLE is adopted 
by realists,230 providing a fundamental chance to examine the effects of law on the 
society and the efficiency of law interpretation by economic and statistical analysis.231 
Based on legal pragmatism, jurists propose concepts of new private law and new 
public law. New public law is akin to critical legal reasoning except for political 
concerns.232 New public law rejects a division between public and private law, a 
completely free market without regulations, and canons in the interpretation of statutes 
and precedents.233 Instead, it believes that statutory interpretation is dynamic and 
 
225
 But see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59 (arguing the foundationalists who consider 
legislative intent, purpose, and text for statutory interpretation fail without pragmatism). 
226
 See supra Part II.A.1.  
227
 See Singer, supra note 54, at 479, 481. 
228
 The creativity on ruling suggests realism. See Posner, supra note 55, at 182 (arguing that 
realists focus on the choice of rule deduction, rather than the process or the logic).  
229
 See id. (distinguishing realism from formalism in legal reasonings of common law).  
230
 See id. at 185–86. 
231
 See Fish, supra note 188, at 1459 (explaining that realists rely on “strong empiricism of 
the social sciences”). 
232
 See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 138, at 780 (comparing new public law and critical legal 
studies). 
233
 See id. at 776–78 (introducing these three creativities made by new public law).  
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concerns social norms.234 By contrast, new private law is akin to practical legal 
reasoning.235 Practical legal reasoning judges and scholars are conventional but 
skeptical and practical, distinguished from critical legal reasoning judges.236 
According to this conventional rationale, for instance, tort law addresses concerns 
about punishment, deterrence, or other public interests, but is still argued as new 
private law because the fundamental relationships and rights dealt by torts are 
privately concentrated.237 The conflicts of the ideologies of new public and private 
laws also suggest that the taxonomies of public and private laws are not as important 
as the measures with respect to public and private interests.  
C. Limitations of the Methodology 
There are limitations caused by the data of GCs. First, the GCs are biased because 
they were selected by the SPC. Therefore, they cannot represent the overall judicial 
reasoning in China. However, they can suggest the future of judicial reasoning in 
China, guided by the SPC. Second, the length of the data, seven years (from 2011-
2019), is much shorter than other common-law countries that have applied precedents 
for hundreds of years. However, it is not a limitation in this research, but rather a broad 
limitation for all empirical legal studies about precedents. Precedents are not 
equivalent to common law. A court that does not cite any precedents could apply 
common-law rules because the GCs suggest that Chinese courts had applied common-
law rules in statutory interpretation before the GC system was established in 2010. 
Moreover, it is not clear how common law evolves when courts cite precedents.238 
 
234
 See id. at 780 (arguing that the differences between critical legal studies and new public 
law are political and cultural). 
235
 “Practical” refers to “prevailing practical ideology” but is distinguished from politics 
because practical legal reasoning uses neutral terms and images. See Feinman, supra note 60, 
at 727–28 (connecting practical legal reasoning and political concerns). 
236
 See id. at 726 n. 8, 728 (arguing that practical legal reasoning scholars rely on convention 
and practical legal reasoning judges are skeptical. If a judge is neither practical nor 
conventional, he or she is radical and critical). 
237
 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1640 (2012) (applying pragmatic theories to argue tort law is more akin to private law 
rather than public law); see also Zipursky, supra note 145, at 459–61 (applying formalism to 
argue that tort law needs concepts and principles, which is more akin to private law to 
compensate plaintiffs); Zipursky, supra note 159, at 1777–78 (discussing civil recourse theory 
and corrective justice theory that support courts to decrease transaction costs between private 
parties and compensate plaintiffs). But see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9–13 (1987) (arguing that tort law functions to deter 
harms). 
238
 See Ryan Whalen et al., Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of 
Information, 9 ELON L. REV. 115, 118 (2017) (“Despite its centrality to the common law process, 
we know very little about precedent citation practices and how they relate to the development 
of the common law.”); see also Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing 
Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1156 
(2005) (“Precedent is one of the most important areas of legal research, but currently there is no 
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Even though Whalen et al. applied precedential data from three countries which are 
more experienced in applying precedents than China (i.e., the U.S., Canada, and 
India), they did not find any empirical evidence of an association between common 
law and precedents.239  
The coding strategy also has limitations. The categorization of policy is relatively 
rough compared to the categorization used by Landes and Posner in their empirical 
study for the U.S. precedents.240 The subject matters in their categorization relied on 
the categorization of the Harvard Law Review, which has carefully categorized 
SCOTUS cases since 1930. Different from the cases adjudicated in the U.S., some of 
which mainly relied on statutes and some of which mainly relied on common law, all 
the GCs have a section of “Related Legal Rule(s),” listing the relevant statutes. Even 
though the ruling courts may cite and apply common-law rules or civil-law principles, 
rather than specific statutes, there is no academic or political authority like the Harvard 
Law Review to conduct a normative categorization for cases in China or the GCs. In 
order to avoid controversial arguments on some normative questions, this research 
adopts a broad categorization on whether state policy backed the litigation, and how 
the government intervened in the litigation either as a party or by giving expert 
testimony, an administrative decision, or statutory interpretations. For example, it is 
arguable that a trademark infringement is a tort issue or an issue of economic 
regulations.241 This research categorizes it as a tort issue but is backed with an implied 
policy concern and involves a government intervention, in which the government 
granted a trademark. 
III. JUDICIAL REASONING IN THE GUIDING CASES 
This Part deploys descriptive statistics and logistic regressions to understand the 
GCs in China. It deploys formalistic evidence to observe whether the GCs show 
judicial concerns about protecting or maximizing public or private interests. While 
traditional and modern formalism includes many factors to be measured, this Section 
only responds to the deficiencies of the distinction between civil and common law 
discussed in Part I. Then this Part tests the hypotheses in Part II by logistic regressions. 
It explores whether public and private interests are consistent with or opposed to each 
other, and how their boundaries are affected by government intervention. Based on 
these empirical analyses, this Part also compares the characteristics of the GCs with 
 
dominant working theory, and only limited empirical evidence, about its role in judicial 
decision-making.”). 
239
 See Whalen et al., supra note 238, at 167. 
240
 See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 252–53. Landes and Posner categorized the subject 
matters of the precedents decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals in 
common law, economic regulation (e.g., tax, antitrust, labor, other federal regulation agencies, 
and patents), civil rights, constitutional, bankruptcy, military, land condemnation, criminal 
cases (including post-conviction proceedings), and criminal cases (excluding post-conviction 
proceedings). 
241
 See Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in 
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REPORTER 1223, 1223–24 (2007) (introducing that trademark 
law has functions to reduce research costs for consumers, protect market orders, and promote 
competition). 
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U.S. court decisions, especially SCOTUS’s decisions. It also discusses the 
implications about what institutional strategies of legal reasoning the SPC uses to 
guide statutory interpretation and judicial reasoning in China. 
A. Descriptive Statistics  
This Section conducts descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the GCs. The 
statistics of the text of the GCs are an overview for the readers who are not familiar 
with how the SPC compiles judicial documents and how Chinese judges write 
opinions.242 There are also statistics for the categories of problems that the courts dealt 
with in the GCs. For example, some GCs respond to procedural questions, and some 
respond to substantive-law questions. In the GCs, some courts solved a legal question, 
and some courts provided a creative method to explore the facts or the evidence. The 
SPC selects GCs with an expectation that GCs can solve those problems and instruct 
future adjudication.243 This Section deploys statistical data to present how public or 
private interests were addressed by the courts as the SPC expects.  
1. Formalistic Characteristics of the Text, Rules, Legal Sources, and Legal 
Issues 
A GC consists of six main sections of “Keywords,” “Main Points of the 
Adjudication,” “Related Legal Rule(s),” “Basic Facts of the Case,” “Results of the 
Adjudication,” “Reasons for the Adjudication,” compiled by the SPC based on the 
court opinion.244 “Related Legal Rules” list relevant legislative statutes that the SPC 
expects to interpret by the case and “Main Points of the Adjudication” can be treated 
as common-law rules made by the ruling court and the SPC.  
With respect to the six main sections, the summary statistics in Table 1 present the 
textual structure of the GCs. In a GC, the SPC on average cites 1.31 statutory laws and 
refines 4.41 keywords and 1.52 court rules. The civil GCs are much longer than 
criminal or administrative GCs. The longest part of an average GC is “Reasons for the 
Adjudication,” explaining how the court analyzed the case to reach the outcome and 
the rules. The average length of the “Basic Facts of the Case” is 913.77 Chinese 
characters, not much shorter than the reasoning part. The GC with the shortest “Basic 
Facts of the Case” only includes 130 Chinese characters because the facts are simple 
and uncontroversial.  
 
 
 
 
242
 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 325 (introducing that legal foundationalists 
analyze law by legislative intent, purpose, and text of the law but criticizing the limitations of 
these characteristics in statutory interpretation). 
243
 The standards for selecting GCs are: “(1) the subject matter is of broad concern to the 
public; (2) the relevant legislation provides only general principles; (3) it is of a typical nature; 
(4) the case is difficult, complicated or new; and (5) other cases have a guiding effect.” Xiaoyi 
& Ling, supra note 121, at 117.  
244
 Gao, supra note 121, at 235 (introducing the six sections and their functions). 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Guiding Case Structure 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
#“Keywords” 112 4.41 0.95 3 7 
#words 112 2718.77 1449.84 809 9018 
# “Main Points of the Adjudication” 112 1.52 0.78 1 4 
#“Related Legal Rule(s)” 112 1.31 0.59 1 4 
#words of the “Main Points 
of the Adjudication” 
112 155.56 72.51 48 500 
#words of “Basic Facts  
of the Case” 
112 913.77 580.27 130 3930 
#words of the “Results of  
the Adjudication” 
112 242.38 176.59 42 1523 
#words of “Reasons for  
the Adjudication” 
112 1302.45 945.85 217 5110 
With respect to “Main Points of the Adjudication,” only 71.43% of the GCs 
(80/112) suggest common-law rules for later courts to follow. The rules in 65% of 
them (52/80) were deduced from abstract and the other twenty-eight GCs were 
deduced from facts.245 The “Main Points of the Adjudication” in the remaining thirty-
two GCs are either too specific to be replicated or merely repeat the statutes, even 
though the courts in 90.63% of these cases (29/32) had a step to separate judicial 
values from facts in their reasoning.  
 
 
 
245
 See Grey, supra note 218, at 15 (arguing that abstract legal principles are the characteristics 
of law under formalism); Posner, supra note 55, at 182 (distinguishing realism from formalism 
based on the different logic of legal deduction between the two rationales). 
35
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Although GCs include a “Related Legal Rule(s)” section, not all GCs actually 
discuss or even cite a legislative statute in their reasoning. Figure 2 shows the legal 
source that the courts of the GCs relied upon in adjudication. 31.25% of the GCs 
(35/112) do not cite any legislative statutes in their reasoning. This does not suggest 
that the ruling courts did not rely on civil-law principles at all. The relevant statutes of 
two of those thirty-five GCs express civil-law principles (i.e., the principle of good 
faith).246 Even though the ruling courts of the two GCs did not discuss the statutory 
language in their reasoning, they followed the civil-law principles. Among the GCs 
that cite a legislative statute, the relevant statutes of four GCs express civil-law 
principles, which the ruling courts followed in their adjudication.247 Moreover, the 
 
246
 Both GCs deal with trademark infringements and involve the same principle, “the principle 
of good faith.” Chengdu Tongde Fuhechuan Taopian Youxiangongsi Su Chongqingshi 
Hechuanqu Tongdefu Taopian Youxian Gongsi, Yuxiaohua Qinhai Shangbiaoquan Ji 
Buzhengdang Jingzheng Jiufenan (成都同德福合川桃片有限公司诉重庆市合川区同德福桃
片有限公司、余晓华侵害商标权及不正当竞争纠纷案) [Chengdu Tongdefu Hechuan Peach 
Slices Co. v. Chongqing Hechuan Tongdefu Peach Slices Co.], 2016 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding 
Case 58 (Chongqing High People’s Ct. 2013) (China) [hereinafter N.58 Guiding Case]; N.82 
Guiding Case. 
247
 Precisely, these civil-law principles are (1) “voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty, and 
credibility,” (2) “good faith,” and (3) “fundamental principle[s] for application of law where 
priority should be given to a special law.” Lan Jianjun, Hangzhou Xiaomuzhi Qiche Weixiu 
Keji Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Tianjinshi Xiaomuzhi Qiche Weixiu Fuwu Youxian Gongsi 
Deng Qinhai Shangbiao Ji Buzhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (兰建军、杭州小拇指汽车维
修科技股份有限公司诉天津市小拇指汽车维修服务有限公司等侵害商标权及不正当竞
争纠纷案) [Lan v. SUREMOOV Auto Maint. & Repair Serv. Co., Ltd. et al.], 2014 Sup. 
People’s Ct. Guiding Case 30 (Tianjin High People’s Ct. 2013) (China) [hereinafter N.30 
Guiding Case] (addressing “principles of voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty, and 
credibility” in Art. 2 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law); Beijing Baidu Wangxun Keji 
Youxian Gongsi Su Qingdao Aoshang Wangluo Jishu Youxian Gongsi Deng Buzhengdang 
Jingzheng Jiufen An (北京百度网讯科技有限公司诉青岛奥商网络技术有限公司等不正当
竞争纠纷案) [Baidu Netcom Sci. and Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Qsun Network Technique Co., Ltd.], 
2015 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 45 (Shandong High People’s Ct. 2010) (China) 
[hereinafter N.45 Guiding Case] (addressing “principles of voluntariness, equality, fairness, and 
good faith” in Art. 2 of Anti-Unfair Competition Law); Liu Chaojiu Su Zhongguo Yindong 
Tongxin Jituan Jiangsu Youxian gongsi Xuzhou Fengongsi Dianxin Fuwu Hetong Jiufen An (
刘超捷诉中国移动通信集团江苏有限公司徐州分公司电信服务合同纠纷案) [Liu v. 
Xuzhou Branch of China Mobile Grp. Jiangsu Co.], 2016 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 64 
(Jiangsu Quanshan District People’s Ct. 2011) (China) [hereinafter N.64 Guiding Case] 
(addressing “principles of fairness and good faith”); Zhejiang Longda Buxiugang Youxian 
Gongsi Su A.P. Mule-Mashiji Youxian Gongsi Haishang Huowu Yunshu Hetong Jiufen An (
浙江隆达不锈钢有限公司诉A.P.穆勒-马士基有限公司海上货物运输合同纠纷案) 
[Longda Stainless Steel Co. v. A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S], 2019 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 
108 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2017) (China) [hereinafter N.108 Guiding Case] (addressing the 
principle of fairness in as prescribed in Art. 5 of the Contract Law and the “fundamental 
principle for application of law where priority should be given to a special law”); Fan Bu 
Zhengdang Jingzheng Fa (反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by 
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courts in 25.89% of the GCs (29/112) applied judicial interpretations. Among these 
GCs, four cited judicial interpretations include legal principles.248 Besides the legal 
principles shown in the language of legislative statutes or judicial interpretations, the 
judicial reasoning in twenty-three GCs applied the legal principles absent in the 
language of legislative statutes or judicial interpretations. In six of those twenty-nine 
GCs (20.69%) that cite judicial interpretations, the courts preempted a government 
interpretation of law. The courts preempted a government decision in three of the 
twenty-nine GCs (10.34%) but deferred to a government decision in six GCs 
(20.69%).  
The courts in 12.5% of the GCs (14/112) reasoned based on an empty legal 
concept: Eleven GCs were reasoned based on “the rule of law” and four GCs were 
reasoned based on “the neutrality of due process.”249 61.18% of the GCs (73/112) 
show creative statutory interpretation – adopting common-law rules, civil-law 
principles not shown in the language of the statutes, or judicial interpretations, other 
than merely relying on the plain language of the legislative statutes.250 However, none 
of the 112 GCs show that the courts expressly relied on any previous court opinions 
to adjudicate. 
  
 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sep. 2, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 2018) art. 2 (China); 
Hetong Fa (合同法) [Contract Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, 
effective Oct. 1, 1999) art. 5 (China). 
248
 There is one guiding case in overlap, citing statutes that include a legal principle and 
judicial interpretations that also include a legal principle.  
249
 FISH, supra note 196, at 210.  
250
 See Smith, supra note 10, at 102 (suggesting considering the importance of creativity of 
jurisprudence and the interaction of various legal sources and legal theories in judicial 
reasoning). 
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Figure 3 presents the legal issues of the GCs. 75.89% of the total GCs (85/112) 
function to solve a question of law by (1) interpreting statutes; (2) applying multiple 
statutes and judicial interpretations to solve a question which the law does not give a 
direct answer; or (3) clarifying the scope of rights and liabilities in social activities. 
25% (28/112) function to solve a question of facts by (1) exploring the truth of the 
facts behind the parties; and (2) explaining how various testimonies assist the process 
of fact exploration.251 82.14% (92/112) deal with substantive law issues and 19.64% 
(22/112) deal with procedural issues.252 
Figure 3 also reflects the problems existing in the Chinese legal regime and how 
the SPC adopts the GCs to instruct the inferior courts in the future. 44.64% of the 
disputes (50/112) were raised because the statutory law is vague – these GCs fill the 
gaps in statutory law and instruct courts in statutory interpretation. By contrast, 
56.25% (63/112) show difficulties in enforcing the law besides vague statutes. These 
GCs show the SPC’s resolution to enforce the law in particular areas, such as the 
enforcement of intellectual property (“IP”) rights.253 83.93% (94/112) define the 
 
251
 There is one guiding case in overlap, equally solving the questions of facts and law. 
252
 There are two GCs in overlap, taking care of both the issues of substantive law and 
procedure.  
253
 The court enforced trademark rights in Guiding Case 87. See, e.g., Guo Mingsheng, Guo 
Mingfeng, Sun ShubiaoJiamao Zhuce Shangbiao An (郭明升、郭明锋、孙淑标假冒注册商
标案) [In re Guo Mingsheng, Guo Mingfeng, Sun Shubiao Counterfeiting Registered 
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Figure 3. The Cagetory of Problems that the Guiding Cases Address
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scope of rights and liabilities, and determine the legitimacy of activities of the 
government and private parties. 16.96% (19/112) mainly function to instruct how 
courts can calculate damages or sentence the wrongdoers. The text of the latter GCs, 
on average, is shorter than the former GCs in a statistically significant degree. 
However, more words were written by the ruling courts and compiled by the SPC in 
the latter GCs to explain the facts and deliver the results and the reasoning.254 
2. Public Interest Considerations 
Table 2 shows the statistics for the variables representing public interests. 84.82% 
have a goal or possibility of maximizing the social welfare. In 30.36%, the courts and 
the SPC attempted to construct a free market. 41.07% show a moral concern addressed 
by the courts and the SPC. 
 
Table 2. The Number of GCs that Concern the Public Interest 
Variables/Category of the GCs Criminal Civil Administrative Total 
1. 3rd Parties’ Interests Concerned by 
Law 
    
N/A 2 22 16 40 
No 6 26 2 34 
Yes 14 19 5 38 
Per. of Y. 63.64% 28.36% 21.74% 33.93% 
2. 3rd Parties’ Interests Concerned by 
Courts 
    
N/A 2 22 16 40 
No 0 15 1 16 
Yes 20 30 6 56 
Per. of Y. 90.91% 44.78% 26.09% 50.00% 
3. Maximized the Social Welfare 
    
No 1 11 5 17 
Yes 21 56 18 95 
Per. of Y. 95.45% 83.58% 78.26% 84.82% 
4. Social Concerns Included 
    
No 0 32 9 41 
Yes 22 35 14 71 
Per. of Y. 100.00% 52.24% 60.87% 63.39% 
5. Policy Backed     
No 19 33 19 71 
Yes 3 34 4 41 
 
Trademarks] 2017 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 87 (Jiangsu Suqian Intermediate People’s 
Ct. 2015) (China) [hereinafter N.87 Guiding Case]. 
254
 In a logistic regression having a binary dependent variable for whether the guiding case 
answers a question of scope of liability or rights or instructs sentencing or damage calculations, 
the independent variables of the length of a GC, the number of words in “Basic Facts of the 
Case,” “Results of the Adjudication,” and “Reasons for the Adjudication” show statistically 
significant results at a 90% level. This result does not change if the logistic regression adds the 
number of paragraphs of “Main Points of the Adjudication” because this control variable does 
not show a statistically significant association with the dependent variable.  
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Per. of Y. 13.64% 50.75% 17.39% 36.61% 
6. Probable Deterrence 
    
No 3 63 22 88 
Yes 19 4 1 24 
Per. of Y. 86.36% 5.97% 4.35% 21.43% 
7. Punitive Damages  
Assigned by Courts 
    
No 22 60 23 89 
Yes 0 7 0 23 
Per. of Y. 0.00% 10.45% 0.00% 20.54% 
8. Fines Imposed by Courts 
    
No 10 65 23 98 
Yes 12 2 0 14 
Per. of Y. 54.55% 2.99% 0.00% 12.50% 
9. Free Market Protected by Courts 
    
No 15 43 20 78 
Yes 7 24 3 34 
Per. of Y. 31.82% 35.82% 13.04% 30.36% 
10. Morality Concerned by Courts 
    
No 4 42 20 66 
Yes 18 25 3 46 
Per. of Y. 81.82% 37.31% 13.04% 41.07% 
Total 22 67 23 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 63.39% (71/112), the ruling courts expressed their concerns about the society 
or the community, or there were implicit social concerns addressed in the GCs when 
they were selected and published by the SPC. The social concerns addressed by the 
courts in adjudication include but are not limited to (1) morality; (2) social 
atmosphere; (3) community perceptions; (4) art and culture; (5) a correction of a status 
quo bias; and (6) the business culture that has not been prevalent and has become 
social norms. The categories of the social concerns addressed by the GCs are shown 
General Public Welfare, 30
Order of the Market, 15
Social Morality, 6
Government's Reputation, 3
Public/Cyber Security, 4
Education, 3
Social Influence, 2
Governance, 7
Power of Judiciary, 1
Figure 4. Number of Guiding Cases Addressing Social Concerns
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in Figure 4. Among the seventy-one GCs, thirty suggest that the courts and the SPC 
concerned the general public welfare, which was expressly or implicitly explained by 
the courts as (1) the public interest; (2) the shared wealth of the public; (3) food safety; 
(4) the benefits of consumers; (5) demands of the residents; (6) compensation for the 
damages of the public; and (7) dangers to the society. Four GCs particularly deal with 
public security or cybersecurity. Courts in fifteen GCs concerned market orders. One 
GC emphasizes the power of the judiciary, and the outcomes of two GCs may attract 
public attention and result in social influence. Seven GCs concern state governance, 
and three GCs facilitate to construct the government’s reputation. The SPC also 
selected three GCs to address educational considerations. In another eight GCs, even 
though the ruling courts did not discuss social concerns in their adjudication, they 
followed social norms.  
Moreover, there are forty-one GCs supported by government policies or 
regulations functioning to support government policies. For example, twenty-two 
address IP issues under the policies from the central government to strengthen IP 
protection and promote innovation.255 The SPC published four maritime GCs in 2019 
after the SPC established the International Business Courtrooms in 2018 under the 
“One Belt One Road” policy.256 These policies show an intent to promote the public 
welfare, however, whether these policies can benefit the public is both an empirical 
question and a controversial normative question to be further explored.  
Even though these policies may influence how the SPC selects GCs, the current 
GCs do not necessarily suggest that the ruling courts which concerned the public 
interest and society always adjudicated as consistent as the policies. There are twenty 
GCs that include a relevant policy but do not show any social concerns of the courts. 
In thirty-six GCs, courts expressed social concerns, but no policies related to the 
embedded legal issues. Moreover, legislative supremacy shows in three GCs, in which 
there were relevant government policies, but their reasoning applied statutes rather 
than strictly followed the policies.  
With respect to the considerations of a third party’s interest, in each category of 
the cases (i.e., criminal, civil, and administrative), the courts concerned the public 
interest in a higher degree compared to the law. In the sixty-seven civil GCs, even 
though the law addressed in 28.36% (19/67) does not protect a third party’s interest, 
the courts in 44.78% (30/67) protected a third party’s interest. In the twenty-two 
criminal GCs, victims were represented by the state, but there are only 63.64% (14/67) 
adopting a law that repairs victims or punishes the wrongdoers. In contrast, the courts 
in 90.91% of the criminal GCs (20/67) had a concern to protect victims or respected a 
victim’s concern in their adjudication.  
Besides the potential effect of the GCs on the judicial system, the SPC may have 
an intention to deter crimes and breaches of liabilities created by law or contract. In 
seven civil GCs, courts assigned punitive damages to the plaintiffs. In 86.36% of the 
criminal GCs (19/22), courts assigned a felony. In two civil and twelve criminal GCs, 
 
255
 See, e.g., Outline of the Eighth-Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 1991 Nat’l People’s 
Cong.) (China). 
256
 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road (Issued by the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, Ministry of Foreign Aff., 
and Ministry of Com.) Mar. 28, 2015 (China). 
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courts imposed a fine. Besides the twelve criminal GCs, there are three other criminal 
GCs in which courts imposed both a fine and a felony on the defendants. If fines, 
punitive damages, and a felony sentence can result in a deterrence effect,257 20.54% 
of the total GCs (23/112) suggest a deterrence function of the GCs. There is one 
criminal GC in which the court imposed a fine, but may not result in a deterrence 
effect because the amount of the fine was less than the illegal profits the defendants 
received from selling counterfeit products.258  
3. Private Interest Considerations 
Table 3 shows the variables related to private interests. In 65.18% of the GCs 
(73/112), courts considered the interests of the litigating parties and attempted to 
maximize their utility in economic wealth, freedom, or reputation. Courts considered 
maximizing the interest or utility of the litigating parties the most in the civil GCs and 
the least in the administrative GCs. The considerations of these courts did not 
necessarily result in an efficient outcome – at least one party was better off after the 
adjudication.259 Some criminal defendants were better off due to the avoidance of the 
imposition of the death penalty or plead guilty in exchange for a shorter term of 
imprisonment. Some criminal defendants were sentenced to pay a fine at a higher 
amount than their illegal profits. The economic utility of these defendants was 
“abnormally” harmed after the adjudication. Similarly, the defendants in some civil or 
administrative GCs were “abnormally” harmed when they were sentenced to pay 
punitive damages or a fine by the courts, in addition to compensatory damages. 
Plaintiffs may also suffer “abnormal” harm if the courts did not entitle them to full 
compensation for their losses on money or reputation. Courts in 65.18% of the GCs 
(73/112) tried to maximize the utility of the parties, but in 43.75% (49/112), at least 
one litigating party was “abnormally” harmed after the adjudication. 
 
Table 3. The Number of GCs that Concern the Private Interest 
Variables/Category of the GCs Criminal Civil Administrative Total 
1. Maximized the Parties’  
Interest 
    
No 8 18 13 39 
Yes 14 49 10 73 
Per. of Y. 63.64% 73.13% 43.48% 65.18% 
2. Utility Variation after Adjudication     
Both are better off 8 7 0 15 
 
257
 See Michael S. Moore, A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 64, 60–63 (Leo Katz et al. ed., 1999) (discussing how deterrence effects works 
in the criminal law mechanism). 
258
 See N.87 Guiding Case. In Guiding Case 27, one of the defendants was an accomplice and 
imposed a fine, which is less than his or her illegal profits from fraud. A fine higher than the 
illegal profits was imposed on the other two defendants Zang Jinquan Deng Daoqie, Zhapian 
An (臧进泉等盗窃、诈骗案) [In re Zang Jinquan et al. Theft and Fraud], 2014 Sup. People’s 
Ct. Guiding Case 27 (Zhejiang High People’s Ct. 2011) (China) [hereinafter N.27 Guiding 
Case]. 
259
 See generally Posner, supra note 212. 
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Per. 36.36% 10.45% 0.00% 13.39% 
No “abnormally” harmed party  2 31 15 48 
Per. 9.09% 46.27% 65.22% 42.86% 
At least one party is “abnormally” harmed 12 29 8 49 
Per. 54.55% 43.28% 34.78% 43.75% 
3. Concerned to Make  
the P. Whole 
    
No 17 48 19 84 
Yes 5 19 4 28 
Per. of Y. 22.73% 28.36% 17.39% 25.00% 
4. Concerned the Extent  
of Injuries Caused by D. 
    
No 10 44 18 72 
Yes 12 23 5 40 
Per. of Y. 54.55% 34.33% 21.74% 35.71% 
5. Make the P. Whole     
No 19 45 15 79 
Yes 3 22 8 33 
Per. of Y. 13.64% 32.84% 34.78% 29.46% 
6. Gave Compensatory Damages     
No 16 41 21 78 
Yes 6 26 2 34 
Per. of Y. 27.27% 38.81% 8.70% 30.36% 
Total 22 67 23 112 
 
35.71% (40/112) discuss the extent of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs and 
caused by the defendants in either the facts (i.e., “Basic Facts of the Case”) or the 
reasoning (i.e., “Reasons for the Adjudication”). 25% (28/112) suggest the intent of 
the courts to make the plaintiffs whole in the expression of their written opinions, and 
29.46% (33/112) made the plaintiffs whole in the outcome of the litigation. When a 
court made the plaintiff whole, the plaintiff’s injuries can be adequately compensated 
by the damages assigned by the court,260 restored by the defendant under a court order, 
or prevented when the court imposed an obligation to enforce a contract between the 
parties. However, having the intent to make the plaintiffs whole in judicial reasoning 
and delivering outcomes in which the courts made the plaintiffs whole were not 
perfectly overlapped. For instance, in only four administrative GCs, courts had the 
intent to make the plaintiffs whole, but the courts in eight administrative GCs made 
the plaintiffs whole in the outcomes. Moreover, among these eight GCs, there is one 
GC, in which the court discussion does not suggest the intent to make the plaintiffs 
whole.  
  
 
260
 The plaintiffs or a third party in 30.36% of the GCs (34) were assigned compensatory 
damages by the courts. 
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B. Public/Private Interests and Formalism 
China cannot simply be categorized as either a civil-law country or a common-law 
country.261 On the one hand, Chinese courts apply and interpret statutes. On the other 
hand, the published GCs cite judicial interpretations and are de facto binding in future 
cases, even though these courts did not cite any precedents. In such a mixed 
jurisdiction, is citing legislative statutes or judicial interpretations associated with 
whether the court is concerned about public and private interests in adjudication? Are 
those concerns associated with the strategies of statutory interpretation or judicial 
reasoning?  
This Section deploys logistic regressions to respond to these two questions by 
estimating whether the courts were concerned about public or private interests. The 
dependent variables capturing the public interest in a GC include (1) whether there 
was a state policy that backed the case; (2) whether the court was concerned about 
maximizing the public interest or utility; (3) whether the court protected a third party’s 
interest; (3) whether the court protected the free market; and (4) whether the court 
addressed any social concerns in adjudication. The dependent variables capturing 
whether the court is concerned about private interests include (1) whether the court 
considered maximizing the interests or utility of the parties; (2) whether there was at 
least one party’s interest or utility “abnormally” harmed after the adjudication; (3) 
whether the court considered making the plaintiff whole; and (4) whether the court 
discussed the extent of plaintiff’s injuries. The dependent variables are binary 
categorical variables. 
The independent variables capture (1) whether the GC cites a legislative statute in 
its reasoning (i.e., “Reasons for the Adjudication”); (2) whether the court relied on a 
specific statute to rule or had to apply common-law rules for lack of specific statutes 
or make a rule to interpret vague statutes (“Specific Statutes”); and (3) whether the 
court cited a judicial interpretation. Statutes and common-law rules have formalistic 
differences between a civil-law system and a common-law system. The inherent 
difference between the two legal systems is how courts interpret statutes and apply 
common-law rules.262 It is, again, a formalistic question, as Sunstein argues that 
formalism is an “interpretive strategy.”263 Thus, there are independent variables 
capturing (1) whether the court used syllogism to deduce the rule (“Syllogism”); (2) 
whether the court deduced the rule from abstracts or facts (“Abstract”); (3) whether 
the court only relied on the text or the plain meaning of legislative statutes or judicial 
interpretations (“Text of Law”); and (4) whether the court was semantic to interpret 
the statutes.264  
 
 
261
 Supra Part I.C.2.  
262
 See supra Part I. 
263
 Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U CHI. L. REV. 636, 638–
39 (1999). 
264
 There are only three GCs in which the courts deduced the rule by using an analogy. 
Whether a court deduces a rule by using an analogy, which is realism and opposed to formalism, 
shows collinearity with other variables, so it is omitted in the model and captured by other 
independent variables of formalism.  
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Table 4 shows the exact design of the logistic regressions and the regression 
results.265 When estimating whether the court protected a third party’s interest, Model 
3 excludes the cases in which a third party is not a relevant approach. The independent 
variables are binary categorical variables. The category of the case (i.e., criminal, civil, 
and administrative) is controlled in the models as a dummy variable for improving the 
robustness of the regression results. Positive coefficients suggest the dependent and 
independent variables are positively associated; Negative coefficients suggest a 
negative association between the dependent and independent variables. The 
coefficients on the independent variables without a star suggest that the association 
the independent and dependent variables cannot be explored at a statistically 
significant level. The bigger obsolete value of the coefficients suggests a stronger 
association between the dependent and independent variables.  
The empirical results in Table 4 show two main findings, which are arguably 
consistent with the first and second fundamental hypotheses based on the 
public/private interest – concentrated spectrum in Figure 1. One finding is that the 
courts addressed public or private interests differently when they cited judicial 
interpretations. The difference did not exist when they cited legislative statutes. 
Precisely, on the one hand, the courts that cited judicial interpretations were less likely 
to consider maximizing the public utility and even far less likely to protect a third 
party’s interest. It supports the first hypothesis with respect to legal formalism and 
common-law rules. On the other hand, the parties in these GCs were more likely to 
both be better-off or not “abnormally” harmed after the adjudication. Citing judicial 
interpretations does not mean that there were no specific statutes administrating the 
legal issues. 68.97% of the twenty-nine GCs (20) that cite judicial interpretations deal 
with the legal issues that have corresponding clear and specific statutes. Among the 
eleven GCs in which the ruling courts used an empty legal concept (i.e., “the rule of 
law”),266 nine GCs did not find any judicial interpretations to apply. The second 
hypothesis with respect to realism cannot be perfectly supported: When courts did not 
find a specific statute to apply or used common-law rules, they were more likely to 
consider market orders.267 
The other finding is that formalistic courts were more likely to consider the extent 
of plaintiff’s injuries and making the plaintiff whole, regardless of what law the court 
cited and applied. However, whether courts followed syllogism to reason and rule is 
not associated with whether courts were concerned about public or private interests. 
When courts only relied on the text of the law, they were more likely to consider 
making the plaintiff whole and much more likely to discuss the extent of the plaintiffs’ 
injuries. By contrast, these GCs are less likely to have a relevant state policy behind 
their legal issues. In other words, if there was a state policy backed the case, the court 
was less likely to be formalistic and merely rely on the text of legislative statutes or 
 
265
 There are seventy-five GCs following syllogism to deduce rules, and the rest thirty-seven 
GCs do not show a logic of syllogism. In forty-six GCs, the courts only relied on the text of the 
law. In sixteen GCs, the courts semantically interpreted the language of the law. The courts in 
sixty-six GCs deduced a rule from facts rather than abstracts. The data distribution with respect 
to other variables in the models of Table 4 is shown in Figure 2, Table 2, and Table 3.  
266
 FISH, supra note 196, at 210. 
267
 The opposite to the protection for a free market is not necessarily the construction of a 
regulatory market but can instead be non-protection for market orders.  
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judicial interpretations. Moreover, when courts semantically interpreted the language 
of the law, they were more likely to address a social concern. Overall, the second 
hypothesis is arguably supported. 
C. Public/Private Interests and Government Intervention 
People are curious about how courts address their personal interests. Are they 
vulnerable in adjudication? How vulnerable are they, especially when the statutory 
law is vague or has gaps? Do courts have policy concerns and behave consistently 
with the government to take care of a third party or the public interest? If the 
government abuses the law, do courts correct the government for private parties or the 
public? It is arbitrary to respond to these questions by ideologically arguing or defining 
whether the law is public or private law. Alternatively, this research avoids these 
arguments and quantitatively responds to the above concerns by gathering the relevant 
information from the GCs.  
 
Table 5. Government Intervention by Category of the GCs 
Variables/Category of the GCs Criminal Civil Administrative Total 
1. Gov. Involvement    
No 15 42 0 57 
Yes 7 25 23 55 
Per. of Yes 31.82% 37.31% 100.00% 49.11% 
Total 22 67 23 112 
2. Gov. Interpretation    
Preempted by Court 1 2 5 8 
Deferred by Court 4 7 12 23 
Per. of Deference 80.00% 77.78% 70.59% 74.19% 
Total 5 9 17 31 
3. Gov. Decision    
Preempted by Court 1 8 15 24 
Deferred by Court 3 16 8 27 
Per. of Deference 75.00% 66.67% 34.78% 52.94% 
Total 4 24 23 51 
4. Expert Testimony    
Private Expert 1 1 0 2 
Gov. Expert. 0 6 3 9 
Per. of Gov. Expert 0.00% 85.71% 100.00% 81.82% 
Total 1 7 3 11 
5. Gov. Authority    
No 16 52 1 69 
Yes 6 15 22 43 
Per. of Yes 27.27% 22.39% 95.65% 38.39% 
Total 22 67 23 112 
6. Accountability    
No 22 63 16 101 
Yes 0 4 7 11 
Per. of Yes 0.00% 5.97% 30.43% 9.82% 
Total 22 67 23 112 
7. Gov. Legitimacy    
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No 20 63 6 89 
Yes 2 4 17 23 
Per. of Yes 9.09% 5.97% 73.91% 20.54% 
Total 22 67 23 112 
 
Table 5 lists the degree of government intervention in the GCs. In a criminal case, 
even though the state is the plaintiff, it does not automatically suggest interventions 
by the government power, so criminal cases are not coded as showing government 
involvement. By contrast, the government can be directly involved in a lawsuit if the 
government or a state-owned enterprise is a litigating party or testifying for the 
litigating parties. It can also be indirectly involved in a lawsuit if the government gives 
a monopoly right or public power to a private litigating party (or a private third party) 
of the lawsuit. Among the 112 GCs, 49.11% (55) show either direct or indirect 
government involvement. These GCs are more likely to address a policy concern but 
less likely to show that courts considered maximizing the interests of the parties.268 
In forty-three GCs, courts discussed or mentioned whether the government had a 
legitimate authority to intervene in the legal issues to some degree. In nine of the 
eleven GCs that courts allowed expert testimony, the courts assigned the government 
or a (state-owned) public research institute to provide the testimony.   
The GCs do not challenge the government much. The government interprets and 
enforces the law.269 Courts in eleven GCs discussed the accountability between the 
judicial system and the government, affirming or rejecting that the private parties had 
standing to sue the government or a government-backed institute in particular 
situations.270 A GC that discusses the accountability is less likely to discuss the extent 
 
268
 Pearson chi2 (for Gov. Intervention and Policy) = 5.2975, p = 0.021. Pearson chi2 (for 
Gov. Intervention and Max. Parties’ U.) = 3.6999, p= 0.054.  
269
 Xianfa art. 67, 107 (2018) (China). 
270
 Wei Yongao Chen Shouzhi Su Laianxian Renmin Zhengfu Shouhui Tudi Shiyongquan 
Pifu An (魏永高、陈守志诉来安县人民政府收回土地使用权批复案) [Wei v. Lai’an], 2013 
Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 22 (Anhui High People’s Ct. 2012) (China) [hereinafter N.22 
Guiding Case]; N.30 Guiding Case; Ruishi Jiaji Guoji Gongsi Su Fujian Jinshi Zhiyou Youxian 
Gongsi Deng Queren Hetong Wuxiao Jiufen An (瑞士嘉吉国际公司诉福建金石制油有限公
司等确认合同无效纠纷案) [Cargill Int’l S.A. v. Jinshi Vegetable Oil Producing Co.], 2014 
Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 38 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2012) (China) [hereinafter N.38 Guiding 
Case] [hereinafter N.33 Guiding Case]; He Xiaohua Su Huazhong Keji Daxue Jujue Shouyu 
Xuewei An (何小强诉华中科技大学拒绝授予学位案) [He v. Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & 
Tech.], 2014 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 39 (Hubei Wuhan Intermediate People’s Ct. 2009) 
(China) [hereinafter N.39 Guiding Case]; Hainan Fenghai Liangyou Gongye Youxian Gongsi 
Su Zhongguo Renmin Caichan Baoxian Gufen Youxian Gongsi Hainansheng Fengongsi 
Haishang Huowu Yunshu Baoxian Hetong Jiufen An (海南丰海粮油工业有限公司诉中国人
民财产保险股份有限公司海南省分公司海上货物运输保险合同纠纷案) [Fenghai Grain & 
Oil Indus. Co. v. Hainan Branch of PICC Prop. & Cas. Co.], 2015 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding 
Case 52 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2003) (China) [hereinafter N.52 Guiding Case]; Bai Wangqing Su 
Chengdu Nanxun Wupin Yingxiao Fuwu Zhongxin Deng Qinhai Shiyongxinxing Zhuanliquan 
Jiufen (柏万清诉成都难寻物品营销服务中心等侵害实用新型专利权纠纷) [Bai v. Nanxun 
Goods Mktg. Serv. Center), 2015 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 55 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2012) 
(China) [hereinafter N.55 Guiding Case]; Dai Shihua Su Jinanshi Gongan Xiaofang Zhidui 
Xiaofang Yanshou Jiufen An (戴世华诉济南市公安消防支队消防验收纠纷案) Dai v. Public 
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of the plaintiff’s injuries.271 Moreover, thirty-one GCs address a government 
interpretation of law, and the courts in 71.19% of these GCs (23/31) deferred to the 
government interpretations. Fifty-one GCs are related to an earlier government 
decision. The courts in the criminal-law and civil-law GCs were more likely to defer 
to a government decision, but courts were more likely to preempt the government’s 
decision in administrative cases when a party sued the government.  
 
Table 6. Estimating the Probability to Maximize the Public Utility/Interest 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Max. Parties’ U. 1.357** 1.365** 1.432** 3.578** 3.710** 3.746**  
(0.677) (0.681) (0.695) (1.542) (1.636) (1.674) 
1. U. Harmed 1.580** 1.613** 1.781** 4.212** 4.618** 4.658**  
(0.722) (0.731) (0.733) (1.857) (2.145) (2.196) 
1.Make P. Whole -0.211 -0.215 -0.00648 0.215 0.368 0.432  
(0.644) (0.645) (0.674) (1.268) (1.326) (1.517) 
1.Injury Ext. 0.142 0.168 -0.0845 2.095 2.334 2.297  
(0.626) (0.629) (0.661) (1.915) (2.006) (2.091) 
1.Gov. 
Involvement 
  
Y 
  
Y 
1.Gov. Authority 
  
Y 
  
Y 
1. Accountability 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
i.Category. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.603 1.578 1.781 -1.287 -1.891 -2.206  
(1.177) (1.177) (1.245) (1.345) (1.904) (3.135) 
Observations 112 112 112 33 33 33 
Note: James Stock’s Heteroskedasticity-standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Sec. Fire Prot. Brigade of Jinan, 2016 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 59 (Shandong Jinan 
Intermediate People’s Ct. 2012) (China) [hereinafter N.59 Guiding Case]; Wang Mingde Su 
Leshanshi Renli Ziyuan He Shehui Baozhangju Gongshang Rending An (王明德诉乐山市人
力资源和社会保障局工伤认定案) [Wang v. Human Res. & Soc. Sec. Bureau of Leshan], 
2016 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 69 (Sichuan Leshan Intermediate People’s Ct. 2012) 
[hereinafter N.69 Guiding Case]; Luo Rongrong Su Jianshi Wujiaju Wujia Xingzheng Chuli An 
(罗镕荣诉吉安市物价局物价行政处理案) [Luo v. Price Bureau of Ji’an], 2016 Sup. People’s 
Ct. Guiding Case 77 (Jiangxi Jian Jizhou District People’s Ct. 2012) (China) [hereinafter N.77 
Guiding Case]; Zhang Daowen, Tao Ren Deng Sue Sichuansheng Jianyangshi Renmin Zhengfu 
Qinfan Keyun Renli Sanlunche Jingyingquan An (张道文、陶仁等诉四川省简阳市人民政府
侵犯客运人力三轮车经营权案) [Zhang v. Jianyang, Sichuan Province], 2017 Sup. People’s 
Ct. Guiding Case (Sup. People’s Ct. 2016) (China) [hereinafter N.88 Guiding Case]; Jiaotong 
Yunshubu Nanhai Jiuzhuju Su Achanggeluosi Touzi Gongsi, Xianggang Andaousen Youxian 
Gongsi Shanghai Daibiaochu Hainan Jiuzhu Hetong Jiufen An (交通运输部南海救助局诉阿
昌格罗斯投资公司、香港安达欧森有限公司上海代表处海难救助合同纠纷案) [Nanhai 
Rescue Bureau of the Ministry of Transp. v. Archangelos Inv. E.N.E.], 2019 Sup. People’s Ct. 
Guiding Case (Sup. People’s Ct. 2016) (China) [hereinafter N.110 Guiding Case]; Circular of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the 21[st] Batch of Guiding Cases (promulgated by The 
Supreme People’s Court of China, Feb. 25, 2019, effective Feb. 25, 2019), 2019 CHINA LAW 
LEXIS 154, 52. 
271
 Pearson Chi-square (for Accountability and Injury Ext.) = 3.7658, p = 0.052. 
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Table 6 shows the association between the concerns of the courts about public and 
private interests. The dependent variable is whether the GC has a reasonable 
expectation of maximizing the public interest. The independent variables are binary 
variables, including (1) whether the court had a concern about maximizing the 
interests of the parties; (2) whether at least one party was “abnormally” harmed after 
the adjudication; (3) whether the court considered making the plaintiff whole; and (4) 
whether the court considered the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. The models control 
for government involvement, government authority, the accountability between the 
judicial system and the government, and the category of the case as dummy variables. 
Model 4 to Model 6 narrow the samples to the GCs in which courts preempted or 
deferred to a government interpretation of law or a government decision.  
Two key findings are shown in Table 6. First, whether courts were concerned with 
maximizing the public interest is positively associated with whether they were 
concerned with maximizing the interests of the litigating private parties. This finding 
could be inherent or endogenous because efficient private transactions benefit the 
public interest. The U.S. Constitution is also an example suggesting that protecting 
private interests could be the public interest.272 The second finding is that a GC that 
is likely to maximize the public interest has a higher probability of delivering a 
decision that harms at least one party “abnormally” compared to the GCs without an 
expressive notion of or a potential for maximizing the public interest. This association 
between maximizing the public interest and whether at least one party was 
“abnormally” harmed after the adjudication is stronger than the positive association 
between maximizing the public interest and maximizing private interests. The two 
associations coexist when the models capture both of them and become stronger when 
the models capture government involvement and the legitimate authority of the 
government. These associations become much stronger among the GCs in which 
courts decided to defer or preempt a statutory interpretation made by the government 
or a government decision. Accordingly, the fourth hypothesis on the association 
between public and private interests is supported, which infers that the third hypothesis 
with respect to pragmatism could be proved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
272
 See Macey, supra note 133, at 240, 267 (explaining that the U.S. Constitution protects the 
public interest but may harm individual rights in some circumstances when judges pursue the 
common good). 
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Table 7 is an extension of Table 6. It adopts the same independent variables but 
replaces the dependent variable to whether the court protected a third party’s interests 
and whether the court addressed social concerns in adjudication. Models 3, 4, 7, and 
8 narrow the samples to the GCs that the courts preempted or deferred to a government 
interpretation of law or a government decision.  
The empirical results in Table 7 suggest two key characteristics of the GCs. First, 
the GCs do not show a statistically significant association between whether a court 
considered protecting the private interests of the parties and whether it protected a 
third party’s interests. Second, the courts that addressed social concerns were more 
likely to consider making the plaintiffs whole, but less likely to consider maximizing 
the interests of the litigating parties. Among the courts that preempted or deferred to 
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the government, these two characteristics disappear. Overall, the public interest and 
private interests are associated in the language of the GCs, but the direction of the 
association is not clear. These statistical results are consistent with the fourth 
hypothesis and indirectly suggest that the GCs are mainly under pragmatism.  
D. Comparison with SCOTUS Decisions 
The frequency of various legal sources adopted by the GCs and SCOTUS decisions 
are divergent. The average rate of government deference on law interpretation 
(20.54%) in the GCs is at a higher level than SCOTUS decisions (5.34%, between 
1890 and 1990,273 49% in 1996,274 14.5%, between 2006 to 2009275). The GCs cite 
legislative statutes twice as frequently as SCOTUS (except for in 1996, when all 
SCOTUS decisions used statutory language),276 but the judicial sources cited in the 
GCs are about half of the amount of the judicial sources upon that SCOTUS relied.277 
Schacter showed a higher rate of applying “judicially-selected policy norms” (73%) 
by SCOTUS decisions compared to the GCs (36.61%).278  
How Chinese courts applied various legal sources in the GCs, however, shows 
common patterns shared by SCOTUS in recent years. Compared to SCOTUS 
decisions in early years, the degree of adopting textual sources by Chinese courts in 
the GCs is slightly lower, and the degree of textualism in the GCs is even significantly 
lower. The judicial reasoning in 18.75% of the GCs (21/112) does not involve any 
textual sources of law, including legislative statutes, judicial interpretations, 
government regulations, or legal precedents. By contrast, besides legislative and 
executive statutory law, SCOTUS also adopts precedents as textual sources of law. 
However, how precedents are cited makes a difference in the law, and the development 
of the law is unclear.279 Between 1890 and 1990, SCOTUS applied textual sources in 
about 85% of its decisions.280 Even though the degree of textualism to interpret 
 
273
 Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1088, 1142 (1992). The limitation is that this study adopts 
random samples of SCOTUS decisions, rather than a full sample.  
274
 Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 18 (1998). 
275
 Krishnakumar, supra note 9, at 236. Krishnakumar’s research adopts a data scope between 
January 2006 to June 2009. 
276
 Schacter, supra note 274, at 18.  
277
 Zeppos, supra note 273, at 1094. 32.30% of the sources of authority in SCOTUS Opinions 
are legislative statutes, and 49.52% of the sources are judicial sources. By contrast, 68.75% of 
the GCs cite at least a legislative statute, and 25.89% of the GCs cite judicial interpretations. 
278
 Schacter, supra note 274, at 18.  
279
 See Whalen et al., supra note 238, at 118 (failing in finding empirical evidence to prove 
any association between precedent citations and how the courts deal with legal issues and rule).  
280
 Zeppos, supra note 273, at 1104. 
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statutes decreased further, it was still higher than 10% in the late 1990’s.281 Textualists 
exclude public values, legislative history, and other policy considerations in their 
statutory interpretation.282 Only one of the 112 guiding cases qualifies as 
textualism.283 Between 2006 and 2009, SCOTUS cases adopted grammar or linguistic 
canons for law interpretation at a rate of 19.9%,284 much lower than the GCs 
(41.07%). However, the GCs are more creative in interpreting the law compared to 
SCOTUS because they use materials other than the primary legal source of statutes in 
China.285  
A limitation of the comparison between the GC system and the U.S. courts lacks 
a significant concern about the public values with respect to the U.S. Constitution and 
Federalism.286 The reason for this limitation is that the political structure and 
governance philosophy of the two countries are different. However, the dimension to 
interpret cases based on how the judicial system treats the public interest allows two 
disparate systems to be reviewed and compared. It also explains why this research 
proposes this dimension and develops empirical analyses around this dimension. 
When making decisions, the GCs suggest that Chinese judges do not engage in 
“judicial activism” more than the U.S. federal judges.287 The public interest addressed 
by SCOTUS between 1986 and 1988 had a lower frequency on (1) making “common-
law gap-filling rules” and concerning “liberal waiver of immunity for commercial 
 
281
 Id. 
282
 Id. at 1102 (“Textualists seek to eliminate from statutory cases non-textual sources, 
particularly legislative history, public values, and other policy considerations.'”). See also Frank 
H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 59, 60 (1988) (arguing that textualists should strictly follow the language of the statutes). 
283
 Zhongguo Pingan Caichan Baoxian Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jiangsu Fengongsi Su Jiangsu 
Zhenjiang Anzhuang Jituan Youxian Gongsi Baoxianren Daiweiqiuchangquan Jiufen An (中国
平安财产保险股份有限公司江苏分公司诉江苏镇江安装集团有限公司保险人代位求偿
权纠纷案) [Jiangsu Branch of Pingan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Zhenjiang Installation Grp. Co.], 
2016 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 74 (Jiangsu High People’s Ct. 2014) (China) [hereinafter 
N.74 Guiding Case]. 
284
 Krishnakumar, supra note 9, at 236.  
285
 Id. 67.5% of SCOTUS decisions relied on the plain meaning of the law. 65.18% of the 
GCs adopt sources other than the language of the statutes to interpret the law. 
286
 See BARRY BOZEMAN, PUBLIC VALUES AND PUBLIC INTEREST: COUNTERBALANCING 
ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM 3 (2007). Public values are a set of the public interest, so this research 
adopts a general concept of the public interest and does not differentiate particular types of the 
public interests. 
287
 “Judicial Activism” is a term argued in a large volume of literature. I address this term here 
to refer whether a court applies law departing from the text of the law for political or policy 
reasons. See William Wayne, The William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1992) (referring to a “political ritual”); Ernest A. Young, 
Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2002) (defining 
“activism” by “focusing on court’s willingness to strike down laws, to depart from the authority 
of text, history, and/or precedent, . . . , or to impose intrusive remedial orders on political 
actors”). 
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enterprises”; (2) deference to agency decisions or agency interpretations of law; and 
(3) preservation of state regulations, compared to the public interest addressed in the 
GCs.288 The Chinese judges adjudicating the GCs had a slightly higher probability of 
deferring to a government decision than preempting a government decision.289 By 
contrast, the probability of deferring to rather than preempting a government decision 
was much higher among the U.S. federal appellate judges in 2008.290 The most 
frequent reason to preempt a government decision is social security in the U.S., but is 
the social wealth in the GCs.291  
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
GCs are a SPC tool for instructing the inferior courts, the judicial system, and 
society. GCs present the SPC’s standards for adjudication, even though the cases can 
be only of limited persuasive value for showing the current adjudication because of 
the limitations of the data size and the expression of the GCs.292 These GCs draw a 
map for the future of adjudication, law interpretation, judicial reasoning, and law 
enforcement expected by the SPC. Therefore, a systematic GC review reveals this 
probable future and the SPC’s expectations.  
A. Strengthen Law Enforcement 
Besides the intent and purpose of the SPC to improve adjudicative consistency,293 
GCs function to strengthen law enforcement in China. The authority of judicial 
 
288
 Eskridge, supra note 68, at 1095. These public values were coded by Eskridge Jr. and this 
research follows his coding strategy to record the public values addressed by the GCs. 
289
 The Chinese judges deferred agency decisions in twenty-seven GCs, three GCs more than 
they preempted agency decisions. 
290
 See Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). The U.S. federal appellate court 
judges deferred agency decisions three times higher (about 287 cases more) than they preempted 
agency decisions in 2008. 
291
 Id. (“[67 of 122 times that a federal appellate court reversed an executive agency 
determination] were Social Security cases.”). 
292
 See discussion supra Part II.C. Doctrinal and institutional analyses suggest broad judicial 
discretion in China. See Hu Yunteng & Yu Tongzhi, The Studies on the Key Complex and 
Arguable Problems of the Case Guidance System, 6 LEGAL STUD. 3, 18 (2008); see also Zhang 
Zhiming, The Basic Understanding of Establishing a Case Guidance System in China, LEGAL 
DAILY, Jan. 5, 2011, at 87. 
293
 Weimin Jr., supra note 12, at 2. 
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interpretations294 and agency interpretations295 were controversial before there were 
GCs addressing them. Because of the de facto binding nature of GCs, not only are the 
inferior courts guided, but people who are governed by the relevant legislative statutes 
also should pay attention to the GCs and the judicial interpretations and government 
regulations addressed in the GCs. Moreover, the SPC has the intent to enforce the law 
for improving judicial efficiency, even though it is an empirical and normative 
question whether the law from the above sources is economically efficient or effective 
to deter particular behaviors.  
Because GCs use multiple legal sources to interpret the law, the enforcement of 
judicial interpretations, government regulations, and agency interpretations are 
strengthened. For example, in the background of Zhang v. Jianyang, the local 
government of Jianyang Municipality in Sichuan province ignored the SPC judicial 
interpretations for the Administrative Law when it issued Notices administrating 
transportation issues.296 The ruling court cited the judicial interpretations and ruled 
that the Notices were void.297 This GC suggests that judicial interpretations are de 
facto binding to local governments through judicial power.  
Moreover, besides the guidance on law interpretation, the GCs provide specific or 
strategic methods for the inferior courts to verify the facts in law enforcement. For 
example, in Shi v. Huaren Elec. Info. Co., Ltd., a GC about copyright infringement, 
the court had technical challenges to understand the accused-infringing software and 
compare it with the copyrighted software to determine copyright infringement.298 The 
 
294
 The term of judicial interpretation can be applied in a broad sense, including but not limited 
to any opinions, explanations, or other documents that the SPC or SPP (Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate) promulgates to specify rules. Before GCs, the judicial interpretations are only in 
the form of written rules or responses to the questions raised by the inferior courts. See 
Chenguang Wang, Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a 
Country of Rapid Social Changes, 4 FRONT. L. CHINA 524, 537–544 (2006); see also Li 
Guoguang, vice president of the Supreme People’s Court, explains the legal system for people’s 
medication, SINA (Sept. 29, 2002), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2002-09-29/0757749891.html; 
see generally Cris X. Li, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-
PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 255 (2003) (discussing the conflicts between judicial interpretations and 
the Constitution of China). 
295
 Constitutional law scholars frequently discuss the authority of government regulations 
from the dimension of “judicial constitutionalism.” See Paul Gewirtz, Constitutional 
Enforcement: Who Should Do It and How?, 4 CHINA L. REV. 1, 3 (Oct. 2016); see generally 
Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. 
REV. 51 (2012); see also Albert H. Y. Chen, The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in 
Contemporary China: Gao Quanxi’s Studies on China’s Political Constitution, 14 CHINA REV. 
183, 195 (2014). 
296
 See N.88 Guiding Case, supra note 270, at 3. 
297
 Id. 
298
 In order to determine copyright infringement, the plaintiff should establish two elements, 
access and substantial similarity, which are similar as the standards of copyright infringement 
in the U.S. See Shi Hongli Su Taizhou Huaren Dianzi Zixun Youxian Gongsi Qinhai Jisuanji 
Ruanjian Zhuzuoquan Jiufen An (石鸿林诉泰州华仁电子资讯有限公司侵害计算机软件著
作权纠纷案) [Shi v. Huaren Elec. Info. Co., 2015 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 49] (Jiangsu 
High People’s Ct. 2006) (China) [hereinafter N.49 Guiding Case]. 
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plaintiff also had difficulty in explaining the accused software due to the same 
technical challenges, and the defendant refused to provide the information. Under this 
circumstance, the court created a test based on the expert testimony to determine the 
similarities between the two software programs. Selecting a GC like Shi suggests that 
the SPC deliberately tries to decrease the transaction costs within the judicial system, 
not merely for improving adjudicative consistency but also for improving judicial 
efficiency. 
B. Public Interest Concerns in Adjudication 
The SPC encourages the judicial system to address the public interest and use 
policy concerns to fill the gaps in statutory law, which does not necessarily harm 
private interests and is similar to some realistic U.S. courts.299 Most GCs address the 
public interest to some extent or from different approaches. A common characteristic 
shared by these GCs is that the ruling courts were less likely to address the concerns 
about the public interest when there were clear and specific statutes or judicial 
interpretations before them. In other words, the courts that did not strictly follow the 
text of the law or use judicial interpretations were more likely to address the concerns 
about the public interest.  
The GCs as policy data suggest that Chinese courts should address public 
concerns, particularly when the courts cannot find any clear and specific statutes or 
judicial interpretations to solve the legal issues. For example, twenty-two GCs deal 
with IP protection because it is frequently addressed in state policies for promoting 
innovation.300 In these GCs, the courts protected market orders, follow-on innovators, 
and the general public welfare.301  
Precisely, in Tianlong Seed Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Xunong Seed Tech. Col, Ltd., even 
though the court determined that both parties infringed the other party’s plant varieties 
based on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, the seeds were processed based on 
the two plant varieties owned by the opposing parties.302 Therefore, the court 
 
299
 Singer, supra note 54, at 485 (arguing that U.S. courts consider the general welfare when 
fill gaps in some contracts). 
300
 See, e.g., People’s Republic of China National Economic and Social Development Eighth 
Five-Year Plan (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991), available on file at 
Cleveland State Law Review; People’s Republic of China National Economic and Social 
Development Ninth Five-Year Plan (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 17, 1996), 
available on file at Cleveland State Law Review. 
301
 See Runhua Wang, New Private Law? Intellectual Property “Common-Law Precedents” 
in China, 89 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Runhua Wang, Stimulating Technical 
Innovation by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in China (July 11, 2016) (unpublished 
J.S.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (on file with University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). The main innovators in China are follow-on innovators, rather 
than pioneer innovators in the developed countries, such as the U.S. 
302
 China does not have plant patents, but it has a similar system of New Varieties of Plants 
to protect patents. See Tianjin Tianlong Zhongye Keji Youxian Gongsi Yu Jiangsu Xunong 
Zhongye Keji Youxian Gongsi Qinhai Zhiwu Xinpinzhong Jiufen An (天津天隆种业科技有
限公司与江苏徐农种业科技有限公司侵害植物新品种权纠纷案) [Tianlong Seed Tech. Co. 
v. Xunong Seed Tech. Col, Ltd.], 2017 Sup. People’s Ct. Guiding Case 86 (Jiangsu High 
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discussed the importance of the public welfare (i.e., grain) in its judicial reasoning and 
assigned compulsory licenses of the two plant varieties to both parties and a lead-time 
compensation to the one party, which developed its plant variety earlier than the 
other.303 Therefore, both parties can deploy the two patents in the future, and the 
public will be benefited when the grain is produced successfully based on the two 
plant varieties.304  
C. Policy Concerns and a Future of Pragmatic Judicial System 
According to the empirical evidence in this research, the SPC expects to construe 
a pragmatic judicial system in China, which embraces both formalistic and realistic 
law interpretation and enforcement. This is also why the empirical results are arguably 
consistent with the fundamental hypotheses, especially the first and second hypotheses 
with respect to legal formalism and legal realism. In other words, the judges can be 
both formalistic and realistic, and their reasoning does not systematically advantage 
the public interest or private interests.  
On the one hand, the GCs suggest that the structure of court opinions, judicial 
reasoning, and law interpretation can be formalistic in China. The SPC provides the 
GCs as templates of judicial opinions for the inferior courts to study and follow. The 
GCs are ideal study materials to train Chinese judges in writing and thinking. On the 
other hand, the SPC encourages that Chinese courts have policy concerns. Besides 
solving the backward disputes, their adjudications should be forward-looking and 
adjust the relationship between the government and society. It is realistic, but disparate 
from a normative concern whether the judicial system of China is independent or not, 
especially when there are several GCs preempting agency interpretations of law and 
agency decisions and affirming standing of private parties on administrative issues.305 
The application of the policy concerns in the GCs implies practical legal reasonings 
in adjudication, even though it may suggest the concerns about the public interest at a 
limited level.306  
For instance, Wei v. Lai’an addresses a policy concern over land and government 
activities when confirming the plaintiff’s standing to sue the government.307 In Wei, 
the plaintiff sued the local government for the government’s Replies, in which it 
 
People’s Ct. 2013) (China) [hereinafter N.86 Guiding Case]; see also Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on Protection of New Varieties of Plants (promulgated by St. Council, Oct. 
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1997) art. 6 (China). 
303
 See N.86 Guiding Case, supra note 302, at 7.  
304
 See id. 
305
 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 143, at 885 (raising an argument that public law may 
need private litigations as an enforcement tool). 
306
 See Feinman, supra note 60, 724–25. 
307
 N.22 Guiding Case, supra note 270, at 4; see Daquan Huang et al., How Do Differences in 
Land Ownership Types in China Affect Land Development? A Case from Beijing, 9 
SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1–4 (2017) (introducing different types of land ownership in China and 
suggesting a strong concern over governance behind the design of these types of land 
ownership).  
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requested the recovery of some land used by the plaintiff.308 The rules in Wei are 
generally consistent with the U.S. standing requirements.309 This GC rules that there 
is no standing in general for any individuals or any organizations to sue administrative 
Replies that were made by local governments because the Replies are “internal 
administrative acts.”310 It also rules that a plaintiff has standing to sue the government 
on the issue that the administrative actions (in the form of Relies) have “an actual 
impact” on his or her rights (and obligations).311 In addition to Wei, there are another 
ten GCs that address standing issues and have direct or indirect government 
involvement.312 Overall, the judicial reasoning in this judicial system is more 
moderate and practical than radical and critical.313  
V. CONCLUSION 
With the emergence of GCs, the Chinese judicial system is recognized as mixed 
and dynamic. Using the dichotomy of civil law and common law to describe such a 
modern judicial system is outdated because the Chinese system exhibits characteristics 
from both. This Article empirically reviews all the GCs published before November 
2019 and unveils the judicial system in China from a perspective of how Chinese 
courts address public and private interests.314 This empirical research suggests that 
Chinese courts are both formalistic and realistic.  
Overall, China is on a path towards legal pragmatism. The SPC instructs the 
inferior courts to include policy concerns and consider the public interest in their 
judicial reasoning. The judicial system in China shares some common characteristics 
with the U.S. judicial system, such as the legal sources used by courts and the 
institutional norm of pragmatism. The SPC suggests a balance between government 
deference and judicial powers in a manner of using GCs as legal sources.  
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 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, [meaning that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way,] and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’ . . . .”). 
310
 N.22 Guiding Case, supra note 270, at 2. 
311
 Id. 
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313
 See Feinman, supra note 60, at 731 (concluding that critical legal reasoning is radicalism, 
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 The SPC published another 27 GCs after publishing 112 GCs addressed in this Article in 
December, 2019. The Supreme People’s Court, Press Conference of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Issuing the 22[nd] to 24[th] Batches of Guiding Cases, THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jan. 14, 2020, 11:12AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-
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Based on the systematic overview of the GCs published by November 2019, I 
suggest that future research should provide more normative analyses for specific 
public interests and policies addressed in the GCs. Moreover, future research should 
conduct more empirical analyses on how the inferior courts apply GCs and address 
these public interests and policies.  
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